In my experience, it's fine, as long as we hold the same definition on both sides of the comparison. But if we use different definitions or one ambiguous one, then we shouldn't necessarily expect non-contradiction to hold, because we're no longer comparing apples to apples.
"Is randomness a key ingredient for free will?"
A lot depends here on what we mean by "free will". If we're trying to preserve some form of social responsibility, then I don't see how randomness makes a difference. If I couldn't be held responsible because the deterministic laws of physics led me to make decision X, then I can't see how I can if the indeterministic laws of physics led to the same decision.
But I'm a compatibilist. I have no issue with someone being held responsible if they had the capacity to foresee the possible consequences of their actions. For me, randomness doesn't seem relevant.
I agree that a lot does depend on what we mean by free will, and there are many notions of what that means. Randomness doesn't seem relevant in the context of a binary determinism-indeterminism view, since either way leads to the conclusion we can't have free will. Chaos or blind chance is no more conducive to volition than determinism since it implies a lack of control.
Thank you for reading the interview. For me, the law of contradiction is perfectly fine in any practical matter (including political discourse, where it is extremely important). However, there are some objects of knowledge, for example in physics, but also in metaphysics, where it can be useful to go beyond it and simply recognize that these objects are (1) inherently ambiguous, or (2) undetermined in themselves.
As for free will, if you think that free will is a thing even in a consistently deterministic view, then of course you do not need randomness. But then the question for me is always the same: how do we explain free will?
I completely agree that many concepts are inherently ambiguous. In my view, one of the most productive activities in philosophy are delineating the various possible meanings of a term. But the nature of language means we can only make things more clear, never perfectly clear for all observers for all time.
On explaining free will, I think this is an example of that ambiguity. Do we mean explaining how the actions of some systems defy reliable predictability? Or do we mean the feeling of ownership we have toward our own actions? Both of these, I think, are subject to mechanistic explanations (limitations of our ability to model, and tracking our own actions vs other actions in the world). Or do we mean something else to be explained?
I definitely agree with you. For me, the question of free will is simple. For humans, it may be something like, "Can we choose to do something that is not already fully determined and will not change?"
Great topics. I like the approach to randomness and free will. Will have to check his work. Meanwhile, this paper might add some further food for thought:
I'm still reading your book (and very much enjoying it) and just last night I just happened to reach the part where you discuss this topic. I've had it on the backburner of my mind to write about how these determinism-indeterminism debates we get caught up in are a uniquely modern problem. In Plato, for instance, freedom is freedom from one's own lower instincts, freedom to be self-ruled in accord with the Good. In other words, freedom has everything to do with agency, but that's excluded at the outset in a reductive mechanistic framework. You put it well when you said:
"Will isn't a hidden variable. Will is an aspect of consciousness, it cannot be just a hidden parameter in a mathematical expression or some unknown gear mechanism determining a probability distribution. Free will is the cause of itself and doesn't need anything beyond itself for a 'reason' to will."
And later: "Our will is obviously constrained by physicality. To be a living being our bodily functions must work according to the laws of physics, chemistry, and biology. I can't stop my aging process by my willpower. Whatever I will, I can't fly by flapping my hands, as I may do in a dream. Physical laws, quantum and classical, constrain our free will. Nonetheless, there remains an enormous creative potential to be expressed." Followed by your examples of probability distributions proving neither lack of agency nor violations of physics. Good stuff!
Right. It's the kind of thing where everyone tells me, "Well... that's obvious," yet the very same people continue to fall into the fallacies that this reasoning was meant to avoid. :)
It resembles the interaction problem of mental causation, which questions how an "unphysical" mind could interact with a "physical" brain. When asked what "unphysical" means, they can't explain it other than to say it is something that doesn’t interact with anything physical. They seem to be unaware of how they posit an impossibility from the outset and then wonder how it could be made possible. :))
Thank you for reading the interview. I didn't know about this paper and will read it with great interest. If you have any other references you would recommend on a question like this, please feel free to share them 🙏
I have a follow-up to that article. https://doi.org/10.53765/mm2024.31 However, it is more technical and may not appeal to everyone's metaphysical preferences. I recommend reviewing the first paper before proceeding to this one. The references in both papers may also provide suggestions for further reading. While, for a full-fledged vision on the subject, you might like to read my book here (last ed. is just out): https://www.amazon.com/dp/3948295166
A book I highly recommend. It's really like several books in one, an entire worldview and many, many sharp insights throughout. One of the best books I've read all year.
I know zilch about formal philosophy, but introducing randomness has never made headway with me in regard to free will. I get the feeling I’m in the minority here.
Free will, as I no doubt too narrowly define it, is the capacity to make choices that are not determined by prior causes *and* are meaningfully attributed to the agent. The problem then is this:
- Determinism: Every choice is causally necessitated—no room for ‘could have done otherwise.’
- Randomness: Events might be uncaused or probabilistic—but they’re also not controlled by the agent.
So neither seems to offer what I intuitively want from free will: intentional control over alternatives.
This, along with some compelling neurological evidence, has always led me to believe that free will is probably an illusion.
I can see how randomness is a useful hammer to crack determinism, but randomness doesn’t capture the essence of free will as intention, and so ultimately doesn’t bridge the gap for me.
I agree with you on your reasoning here. Neither determinism nor indeterminism make free will possible. Only I would add that it's the predominant reductive-mechanistic view that insists on a lack of agency. Which makes the question of free will within that framework pretty dang ridiculous, because of course there's no free will! That was stipulated at the beginning! To even coherently ask the question, you have to step outside of that framework, and doing that brings to the forefront the even bigger question: Must I accept this either/or dichotomy inherent to the reductive picture? Can I not allow the self-determinism (which I experience all the time!) into my worldview?
>Must I accept this either/or dichotomy inherent to the reductive picture?
Definitely not. Please don’t.
>Can I not allow the self-determinism (which I experience all the time!) into my worldview?
I wouldn’t dream of ruling self-determinism out. As you probably guessed, I experience it, too. At least it sure feels like I do.
It’s just that I so thoroughly and consistently deceive myself through rationalization, cognitive bias, misperception, etc. in service of some utility I might not even be aware of that I hesitate to rule out that possibility in the moments when I feel like I’m making a deliberate choice. That, and so many of my apparent choices—the vast majority, in fact—are already made absent my conscious consideration. So it seems plausible to me that when I do experience conscious choice, it might be an adaptive feedback mechanism instead of a meaningful branching point.
I’m fully rooting for your perspective. It’s certainly the more attractive and intuitive of the two. I live my life, more or less, like free will exists (and it very well might). Though I must admit I’m keen to imagine its absence when trying to summon up compassion and forgiveness for someone who ostensibly chooses to do something unforgivable.
Well put. It's interesting that you mention rationalization and bias in this context, because I think that's actually far more relevant to the question of free will than the issues that more often get discussed about the determinism of the universe. I think your concerns derived from self-reflection are right at the heart of the issue.
One thing worth mulling over: the reason we think we might not be self-determined comes from the moments of self reflection that you point out, when we realize we were (or even are) rationalizing or being biased or pig headed or...well, not ourselves. Which means "someone" is standing over this rationalizing process, watching it and evaluating it, otherwise we'd never know about such moments or have any reason to doubt ourselves. That relatively impartial "someone" is either reliable, at least to some degree, or totally and utterly deceived. But if it's deceived, what reason do we have for believing anything we think? How can we even know whether our experiences are adaptive feedback mechanisms? Those who take the view that we have evolved to have completely non-veridical experiences forget to throw their own views under the bus as well. But if what they're saying is true, then there's no reason to think what they saying is true! To say experience can never be trusted is a nonsensical self-undermining position.
Or we can choose to take the more coherent view that if we self reflect more often instead of letting the obliviously infantile asshole within us ruin everything, we have some chance of noticing our biases and rationalizations and we can work to prevent them, or at least know when we need to apologize. Here we have a more interesting theory of evolution, the evolution of life as we actually experience it, without which there couldn't be scientific progress, much less self improvement.
My idea, which may be a bad one or a good one, is that if there are random elements (then elements that are not yet determined), it may open the door for living beings to determine them on a fundamental level. In other words, it consists in thinking that we have freedom of choice because there is space opened up by undeterministic elements in nature itself.
Tbh, I cannot make any sense of the idea of the principle of non-contradiction not holding. Unless we mean that all statements/words/concepts are ultimately contradictory or ambiguous? That would roughly fit with my understanding of Buddhist philosophy, but I'm not sure...
I do think randomness is a key ingredient for free will. That plus "top-down" causality. Could there be top-down causality without "space" made for it by randomness? I don't know. Evolution is an example of top-down causality, and that relies on random mutations. Of course they don't need to be truly random, but ultimately, all the apparent randomness seems to trace back to deeper randomness, like how quantum fluctuations shaped the early universe seems to account for its general irregularity. Without that randomness, the universe would (I think) be uniform, and so nothing very interesting and no top-down causality. It's randomness that allows exploring multiple options, which is the core of free will.
On non-contradiction, I'll have to leave this one to Romaric.
"Could there be top-down causality without "space" made for it by randomness?" I think I get what you're saying here, and Plato would agree, though he called his "errant cause" a kind of "bastard reasoning". ;) Of course, it's hard to see how else he could have proceeded with his "likely story". The problem for him is, he can't take the perspective of Being, where everything is known all at once and outside of time, to explain the world of Becoming which we inhabit. He needed some sort of randomness to explain why motion and causality exist. He needed space, as you say. And an explanation for how we can fail to live up to the Good, space for an intricate psychology.
But I'm not sure what you mean by "Evolution is an example of top-down causality"?
That sounds really interesting, where does Plato discuss it? I've been meaning to read some more Plato, but not sure what yet.
What I mean about seeing evolution as top-down causality, is that it's essentially purpose-driven. We evolved eyes precisely because they help us see. It's teleological (a lot of materialists get upset when I say this, but it's true). It's also formal causality, because evolution is about how the parts (eg the components of the eye) work together to function. It's this holistic and teleological causality that I mean by "top-down" causality, as opposed to the fundamental forces of physics at the level of particle physics which we can view as merely material and mechanical causality.
Those ideas come from the Timaeus, my favorite dialogue. I'm considering re-reading it myself at some point. It's unlike his other dialogues in that he's trying to provide a 'scientific' account of the universe (which is why it can only ever be a 'likely story'). It's both mind-blowing and mysterious. I haven't even come close to making sense of it, but it's a fascinating read. I think you'll like it.
Oh, teleological. Okay, gotcha. Well, as you know, that's right up my alley! And I agree, even staunch materialists have a hard time talking about evolution without evoking some form of purpose.
That's not a bad idea except I'm afraid hardly anyone will be interested in reading the Timaeus. These days there's a very strong implicit belief in historical progress that leads many to think our contemporary philosophers are more interesting than one of the greatest minds of all time. The other concern is, there's a reason professors don't teach the Timaeus in intro to philosophy. I've read it several times, but I still find it mysterious, though wonderfully so. But I'll need to find a good commentary myself to make sense of it. Still, it's well worth the dive. It's one of the most profound of the Platonic dialogues, one of the most profound works ever written, actually. But we'll see! I have a few books to get through first, then I might look for a fresh translation and see what I can do.
Thanks for reading the interview. For me, the law of contradiction is perfectly fine in any practical matter (including political discourse, where it is extremely important). However, there are some objects of knowledge, for example in physics, but also in metaphysics, where it can be useful to go beyond it and recognize that these objects are (1) inherently ambiguous, or (2) undetermined.
Just to pick up on Tina's love of Plato, I would add that this is one of the elements that makes Derrida's interpretation of Plato's Khôra interesting.
An actual interview with a renowned philosopher is a great addition to your substack. Kudos to you girl.......
The example Romaric used of the statue of the golden apple is an accurate depiction of how Buddhist logic employs Nāgārjuna’s tetra-lemma. However, it must be pointed out that this modality of four possibilities to any proposition is a perversion of the tetra-lemma, and as a modality of logic the tetra-lemma was never intended to be used in this way. It was designed by Nāgārjuna to deter otherwise determined monks from trying to build an intellectual construction of the ultimate reality. With that purpose in mind the modality of the tetra-lemma works like this:
A proposition is neither true nor is it false and... it is neither not true and it is neither not false.
As a modality of logic, what the tetra-lemma was designed to do was to provide an alternative or third lemma to the binary alternatives of either a true or false answer to any proposition. And that third alternate or third lemma is "I don't know".
Thanks! I'm glad you enjoyed it. As for the tetra-lemma, I'll have to leave that to Romaric. There is a link to his paper in the post, if you want to check it out.
Yeah, I did take the time to read Romaric's essay. I'm kind of a Nāgārjuna pundit so to speak. So I thought the additional anecdote I provided would be useful if any of your readers were interested.
Thank you for your comment. I agree with your point about Nāgārjuna. If you look at my substack, you will find several posts where I insist that Nāgārjuna's rhetoric makes sense as part of Buddhist practice. His use of the tetralemma itself should be understood within this framework. This is precisely one of the criticisms I made of Yamauchi in my book.
(It does not suppress the interest in biaffirmation and binegation in some cases.)
Anyway, that is the fourth lemma (ni A ni non-A = binegation) which is equivalent to "I don't know."
Correct, and that’s the problem I’m pointing out. Like you stated, (ni A ni non-A = bi-negation) which is equivalent to "I don't know". Technically, tetra means three and the interest in the fourth lemma of bi-affirmation and bi-negation was added later by monks who were spin-doctors. It is this "spin" that makes the tetra-lemma so confusion, especially for Westerners.
Here is a short quote from my book:
"The tetra-lemma was specifically designed to deal with questions that cannot be resolved utilizing the architecture of syllogism, questions that have to do with indeterminate structural patterns such as the ultimate reality. The tetra-lemma was created to act as a deterrent for anyone who would be tempted to build a mental construction of the ultimate reality. It was designed to be the final solution for the disciples of Buddhism and their obsession with the afterlife."
But like all zealous religious fanatics, the Buddhist disciples wouldn't let their obsession with the afterlife go. So they incorporated the fourth lemma of bi-affirmation and bi-negation in an attempt to justify their mental construction of the ultimate reality; a mental construction that we recognize today as Idealism.
I think you know where I stand on free will, randomness and determinism so I'll take a pass on that one. I'll have to admit that I am surprised how many seemingly intelligent people buy into that nonsense.
I consider being psychologically coerced by the institution of science to choose between two alternatives neither of which are favorable to be nonsense. The dynamics of our universe are neither deterministic nor are they random.
The Standard Model of physics describes mathematical, structural relationships. It says nothing about any "intrinsic properties" of electrons and it says nothing about what the structures are instantiated in. This simply is beyond the scope of physics theory.
The short and the final answer is that intrinsic properties and what the structures are instantiated in cannot be answered by the physical sciences. I am a freelance meta-physicist and my metaphysical model not only describes the intrinsic properties but it also accounts for a limited degree of self-determination at every level of complexity. The more complex and highly organized the system, the greater degree of self-determination.
Here's the fundamental problem: Homo Sapiens are tool makers and we are dam good at what we do. I mean, look at all of the technical advancements we've made using the tool of mathematics. Tool making is causally closed and essentially what we have done is superimpose a model of the universe based upon our understanding and knowledge of tool making.
And by the way, I'm not a panpsychist I am what I term a pragmatic physicalist.
Yes! We distinguish between law and boundary conditions because we are used to driving our own tools and machines, which are invariably open systems with adjustable knobs. We are confused by closed systems, like the whole Universe. In fact we can’t even imagine a closed system/ the whole universe: if you can see it from the outside then it’s not closed / it’s not the totality of what exists (because you are outside of it).
Good observation! This reminds me of the thought experiment about whether space is finite or infinite. You're to imagine yourself going to the edge of space and throwing a javelin outside space's boundary. Where does it go? It's hard to imagine it going anywhere except into more space. But if that's the case, you're not at the edge of space. And so on. Which suggests the universe is infinite...or space is how we experience of the world.
Arguably this paradox has been resolved by allowing a non-trivial topology for the Universe. A two-dimensional analogy would be the surface of the Earth: while not infinite, it does not have a boundary.
Yeah, I've heard about that. I don't know. Maybe I don't get the concepts, but the pictures I've seen look like they do have boundaries. Or maybe I just can't wrap my head around the idea.
Intriguing ideas. At one point, they reminded me of how some authors allow for indeterminism at quantum levels in top-down causation, which avoids deterministic claims that we couldn’t have acted otherwise. As in Kane (1996), indeterminism needn't make our choices erratic but just help randomly create options for our more deliberate levels of thinking to draw upon. Creativity and free will might thus embody an element of randomness. --Just some random thoughts stimulated by your more expansive ideas.
Hi Mostyn! "Creativity and free will might thus embody an element of randomness"—I like that idea. It does seem to me a useful dualism, determinism + "errant cause" or randomness, at least from the cosmological perspective. The two elements (which are really two sides of the same coin) combine to create "the greatest possible unity of the greatest possible diversity".
"If we assume that the mind is a non-physical entity or ‘substance,’ how could it interact with a completely different physical substance, like our brain?"
There's an embedded zombie question here, and like all zombie questions it's more about your priors than reality.
If eventually science were to conclusively prove that consciousness is completely outside science and unknowable, would you take this to mean that it exists in a supernatural realm or merely that there exists a higher level of physics that we haven't yet found a way to explore?
If the former you're a dualist, if the latter you're not, but they actually say the same thing.
Great Interview!. Romaric explains so complex things in an easy language without failing in simplism.
Congrats you both!
Thanks! I agree!
Thank you for your words 🙏
Interesting interview.
"Is the law of non-contradiction too binary?"
In my experience, it's fine, as long as we hold the same definition on both sides of the comparison. But if we use different definitions or one ambiguous one, then we shouldn't necessarily expect non-contradiction to hold, because we're no longer comparing apples to apples.
"Is randomness a key ingredient for free will?"
A lot depends here on what we mean by "free will". If we're trying to preserve some form of social responsibility, then I don't see how randomness makes a difference. If I couldn't be held responsible because the deterministic laws of physics led me to make decision X, then I can't see how I can if the indeterministic laws of physics led to the same decision.
But I'm a compatibilist. I have no issue with someone being held responsible if they had the capacity to foresee the possible consequences of their actions. For me, randomness doesn't seem relevant.
I agree that a lot does depend on what we mean by free will, and there are many notions of what that means. Randomness doesn't seem relevant in the context of a binary determinism-indeterminism view, since either way leads to the conclusion we can't have free will. Chaos or blind chance is no more conducive to volition than determinism since it implies a lack of control.
Thank you for reading the interview. For me, the law of contradiction is perfectly fine in any practical matter (including political discourse, where it is extremely important). However, there are some objects of knowledge, for example in physics, but also in metaphysics, where it can be useful to go beyond it and simply recognize that these objects are (1) inherently ambiguous, or (2) undetermined in themselves.
As for free will, if you think that free will is a thing even in a consistently deterministic view, then of course you do not need randomness. But then the question for me is always the same: how do we explain free will?
I completely agree that many concepts are inherently ambiguous. In my view, one of the most productive activities in philosophy are delineating the various possible meanings of a term. But the nature of language means we can only make things more clear, never perfectly clear for all observers for all time.
On explaining free will, I think this is an example of that ambiguity. Do we mean explaining how the actions of some systems defy reliable predictability? Or do we mean the feeling of ownership we have toward our own actions? Both of these, I think, are subject to mechanistic explanations (limitations of our ability to model, and tracking our own actions vs other actions in the world). Or do we mean something else to be explained?
I definitely agree with you. For me, the question of free will is simple. For humans, it may be something like, "Can we choose to do something that is not already fully determined and will not change?"
Great topics. I like the approach to randomness and free will. Will have to check his work. Meanwhile, this paper might add some further food for thought:
https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.30.5.032
I'm still reading your book (and very much enjoying it) and just last night I just happened to reach the part where you discuss this topic. I've had it on the backburner of my mind to write about how these determinism-indeterminism debates we get caught up in are a uniquely modern problem. In Plato, for instance, freedom is freedom from one's own lower instincts, freedom to be self-ruled in accord with the Good. In other words, freedom has everything to do with agency, but that's excluded at the outset in a reductive mechanistic framework. You put it well when you said:
"Will isn't a hidden variable. Will is an aspect of consciousness, it cannot be just a hidden parameter in a mathematical expression or some unknown gear mechanism determining a probability distribution. Free will is the cause of itself and doesn't need anything beyond itself for a 'reason' to will."
And later: "Our will is obviously constrained by physicality. To be a living being our bodily functions must work according to the laws of physics, chemistry, and biology. I can't stop my aging process by my willpower. Whatever I will, I can't fly by flapping my hands, as I may do in a dream. Physical laws, quantum and classical, constrain our free will. Nonetheless, there remains an enormous creative potential to be expressed." Followed by your examples of probability distributions proving neither lack of agency nor violations of physics. Good stuff!
Right. It's the kind of thing where everyone tells me, "Well... that's obvious," yet the very same people continue to fall into the fallacies that this reasoning was meant to avoid. :)
It resembles the interaction problem of mental causation, which questions how an "unphysical" mind could interact with a "physical" brain. When asked what "unphysical" means, they can't explain it other than to say it is something that doesn’t interact with anything physical. They seem to be unaware of how they posit an impossibility from the outset and then wonder how it could be made possible. :))
Thank you for reading the interview. I didn't know about this paper and will read it with great interest. If you have any other references you would recommend on a question like this, please feel free to share them 🙏
I have a follow-up to that article. https://doi.org/10.53765/mm2024.31 However, it is more technical and may not appeal to everyone's metaphysical preferences. I recommend reviewing the first paper before proceeding to this one. The references in both papers may also provide suggestions for further reading. While, for a full-fledged vision on the subject, you might like to read my book here (last ed. is just out): https://www.amazon.com/dp/3948295166
Thank you for your interest.
A book I highly recommend. It's really like several books in one, an entire worldview and many, many sharp insights throughout. One of the best books I've read all year.
I will try to find your book. Thank you!
I know zilch about formal philosophy, but introducing randomness has never made headway with me in regard to free will. I get the feeling I’m in the minority here.
Free will, as I no doubt too narrowly define it, is the capacity to make choices that are not determined by prior causes *and* are meaningfully attributed to the agent. The problem then is this:
- Determinism: Every choice is causally necessitated—no room for ‘could have done otherwise.’
- Randomness: Events might be uncaused or probabilistic—but they’re also not controlled by the agent.
So neither seems to offer what I intuitively want from free will: intentional control over alternatives.
This, along with some compelling neurological evidence, has always led me to believe that free will is probably an illusion.
I can see how randomness is a useful hammer to crack determinism, but randomness doesn’t capture the essence of free will as intention, and so ultimately doesn’t bridge the gap for me.
I agree with you on your reasoning here. Neither determinism nor indeterminism make free will possible. Only I would add that it's the predominant reductive-mechanistic view that insists on a lack of agency. Which makes the question of free will within that framework pretty dang ridiculous, because of course there's no free will! That was stipulated at the beginning! To even coherently ask the question, you have to step outside of that framework, and doing that brings to the forefront the even bigger question: Must I accept this either/or dichotomy inherent to the reductive picture? Can I not allow the self-determinism (which I experience all the time!) into my worldview?
>Must I accept this either/or dichotomy inherent to the reductive picture?
Definitely not. Please don’t.
>Can I not allow the self-determinism (which I experience all the time!) into my worldview?
I wouldn’t dream of ruling self-determinism out. As you probably guessed, I experience it, too. At least it sure feels like I do.
It’s just that I so thoroughly and consistently deceive myself through rationalization, cognitive bias, misperception, etc. in service of some utility I might not even be aware of that I hesitate to rule out that possibility in the moments when I feel like I’m making a deliberate choice. That, and so many of my apparent choices—the vast majority, in fact—are already made absent my conscious consideration. So it seems plausible to me that when I do experience conscious choice, it might be an adaptive feedback mechanism instead of a meaningful branching point.
I’m fully rooting for your perspective. It’s certainly the more attractive and intuitive of the two. I live my life, more or less, like free will exists (and it very well might). Though I must admit I’m keen to imagine its absence when trying to summon up compassion and forgiveness for someone who ostensibly chooses to do something unforgivable.
Well put. It's interesting that you mention rationalization and bias in this context, because I think that's actually far more relevant to the question of free will than the issues that more often get discussed about the determinism of the universe. I think your concerns derived from self-reflection are right at the heart of the issue.
One thing worth mulling over: the reason we think we might not be self-determined comes from the moments of self reflection that you point out, when we realize we were (or even are) rationalizing or being biased or pig headed or...well, not ourselves. Which means "someone" is standing over this rationalizing process, watching it and evaluating it, otherwise we'd never know about such moments or have any reason to doubt ourselves. That relatively impartial "someone" is either reliable, at least to some degree, or totally and utterly deceived. But if it's deceived, what reason do we have for believing anything we think? How can we even know whether our experiences are adaptive feedback mechanisms? Those who take the view that we have evolved to have completely non-veridical experiences forget to throw their own views under the bus as well. But if what they're saying is true, then there's no reason to think what they saying is true! To say experience can never be trusted is a nonsensical self-undermining position.
Or we can choose to take the more coherent view that if we self reflect more often instead of letting the obliviously infantile asshole within us ruin everything, we have some chance of noticing our biases and rationalizations and we can work to prevent them, or at least know when we need to apologize. Here we have a more interesting theory of evolution, the evolution of life as we actually experience it, without which there couldn't be scientific progress, much less self improvement.
My idea, which may be a bad one or a good one, is that if there are random elements (then elements that are not yet determined), it may open the door for living beings to determine them on a fundamental level. In other words, it consists in thinking that we have freedom of choice because there is space opened up by undeterministic elements in nature itself.
Tbh, I cannot make any sense of the idea of the principle of non-contradiction not holding. Unless we mean that all statements/words/concepts are ultimately contradictory or ambiguous? That would roughly fit with my understanding of Buddhist philosophy, but I'm not sure...
I do think randomness is a key ingredient for free will. That plus "top-down" causality. Could there be top-down causality without "space" made for it by randomness? I don't know. Evolution is an example of top-down causality, and that relies on random mutations. Of course they don't need to be truly random, but ultimately, all the apparent randomness seems to trace back to deeper randomness, like how quantum fluctuations shaped the early universe seems to account for its general irregularity. Without that randomness, the universe would (I think) be uniform, and so nothing very interesting and no top-down causality. It's randomness that allows exploring multiple options, which is the core of free will.
On non-contradiction, I'll have to leave this one to Romaric.
"Could there be top-down causality without "space" made for it by randomness?" I think I get what you're saying here, and Plato would agree, though he called his "errant cause" a kind of "bastard reasoning". ;) Of course, it's hard to see how else he could have proceeded with his "likely story". The problem for him is, he can't take the perspective of Being, where everything is known all at once and outside of time, to explain the world of Becoming which we inhabit. He needed some sort of randomness to explain why motion and causality exist. He needed space, as you say. And an explanation for how we can fail to live up to the Good, space for an intricate psychology.
But I'm not sure what you mean by "Evolution is an example of top-down causality"?
That sounds really interesting, where does Plato discuss it? I've been meaning to read some more Plato, but not sure what yet.
What I mean about seeing evolution as top-down causality, is that it's essentially purpose-driven. We evolved eyes precisely because they help us see. It's teleological (a lot of materialists get upset when I say this, but it's true). It's also formal causality, because evolution is about how the parts (eg the components of the eye) work together to function. It's this holistic and teleological causality that I mean by "top-down" causality, as opposed to the fundamental forces of physics at the level of particle physics which we can view as merely material and mechanical causality.
Those ideas come from the Timaeus, my favorite dialogue. I'm considering re-reading it myself at some point. It's unlike his other dialogues in that he's trying to provide a 'scientific' account of the universe (which is why it can only ever be a 'likely story'). It's both mind-blowing and mysterious. I haven't even come close to making sense of it, but it's a fascinating read. I think you'll like it.
Oh, teleological. Okay, gotcha. Well, as you know, that's right up my alley! And I agree, even staunch materialists have a hard time talking about evolution without evoking some form of purpose.
Oh nice, that's the one I keep hearing about. I'll go for that next then.
Have you considered doing a read through/commentary on it here? That would be very convenient for me XD
That's not a bad idea except I'm afraid hardly anyone will be interested in reading the Timaeus. These days there's a very strong implicit belief in historical progress that leads many to think our contemporary philosophers are more interesting than one of the greatest minds of all time. The other concern is, there's a reason professors don't teach the Timaeus in intro to philosophy. I've read it several times, but I still find it mysterious, though wonderfully so. But I'll need to find a good commentary myself to make sense of it. Still, it's well worth the dive. It's one of the most profound of the Platonic dialogues, one of the most profound works ever written, actually. But we'll see! I have a few books to get through first, then I might look for a fresh translation and see what I can do.
Thanks for reading the interview. For me, the law of contradiction is perfectly fine in any practical matter (including political discourse, where it is extremely important). However, there are some objects of knowledge, for example in physics, but also in metaphysics, where it can be useful to go beyond it and recognize that these objects are (1) inherently ambiguous, or (2) undetermined.
Just to pick up on Tina's love of Plato, I would add that this is one of the elements that makes Derrida's interpretation of Plato's Khôra interesting.
An actual interview with a renowned philosopher is a great addition to your substack. Kudos to you girl.......
The example Romaric used of the statue of the golden apple is an accurate depiction of how Buddhist logic employs Nāgārjuna’s tetra-lemma. However, it must be pointed out that this modality of four possibilities to any proposition is a perversion of the tetra-lemma, and as a modality of logic the tetra-lemma was never intended to be used in this way. It was designed by Nāgārjuna to deter otherwise determined monks from trying to build an intellectual construction of the ultimate reality. With that purpose in mind the modality of the tetra-lemma works like this:
A proposition is neither true nor is it false and... it is neither not true and it is neither not false.
As a modality of logic, what the tetra-lemma was designed to do was to provide an alternative or third lemma to the binary alternatives of either a true or false answer to any proposition. And that third alternate or third lemma is "I don't know".
Thanks! I'm glad you enjoyed it. As for the tetra-lemma, I'll have to leave that to Romaric. There is a link to his paper in the post, if you want to check it out.
Yeah, I did take the time to read Romaric's essay. I'm kind of a Nāgārjuna pundit so to speak. So I thought the additional anecdote I provided would be useful if any of your readers were interested.
Nice! Thanks!
Thank you for your comment. I agree with your point about Nāgārjuna. If you look at my substack, you will find several posts where I insist that Nāgārjuna's rhetoric makes sense as part of Buddhist practice. His use of the tetralemma itself should be understood within this framework. This is precisely one of the criticisms I made of Yamauchi in my book.
(It does not suppress the interest in biaffirmation and binegation in some cases.)
Anyway, that is the fourth lemma (ni A ni non-A = binegation) which is equivalent to "I don't know."
Correct, and that’s the problem I’m pointing out. Like you stated, (ni A ni non-A = bi-negation) which is equivalent to "I don't know". Technically, tetra means three and the interest in the fourth lemma of bi-affirmation and bi-negation was added later by monks who were spin-doctors. It is this "spin" that makes the tetra-lemma so confusion, especially for Westerners.
Here is a short quote from my book:
"The tetra-lemma was specifically designed to deal with questions that cannot be resolved utilizing the architecture of syllogism, questions that have to do with indeterminate structural patterns such as the ultimate reality. The tetra-lemma was created to act as a deterrent for anyone who would be tempted to build a mental construction of the ultimate reality. It was designed to be the final solution for the disciples of Buddhism and their obsession with the afterlife."
But like all zealous religious fanatics, the Buddhist disciples wouldn't let their obsession with the afterlife go. So they incorporated the fourth lemma of bi-affirmation and bi-negation in an attempt to justify their mental construction of the ultimate reality; a mental construction that we recognize today as Idealism.
Thank you for your reply. I would say that tetra means four. As for the rest, I agree for sure.
I think you know where I stand on free will, randomness and determinism so I'll take a pass on that one. I'll have to admit that I am surprised how many seemingly intelligent people buy into that nonsense.
What do you consider nonsense?
I consider being psychologically coerced by the institution of science to choose between two alternatives neither of which are favorable to be nonsense. The dynamics of our universe are neither deterministic nor are they random.
The Standard Model of physics describes mathematical, structural relationships. It says nothing about any "intrinsic properties" of electrons and it says nothing about what the structures are instantiated in. This simply is beyond the scope of physics theory.
The short and the final answer is that intrinsic properties and what the structures are instantiated in cannot be answered by the physical sciences. I am a freelance meta-physicist and my metaphysical model not only describes the intrinsic properties but it also accounts for a limited degree of self-determination at every level of complexity. The more complex and highly organized the system, the greater degree of self-determination.
Here's the fundamental problem: Homo Sapiens are tool makers and we are dam good at what we do. I mean, look at all of the technical advancements we've made using the tool of mathematics. Tool making is causally closed and essentially what we have done is superimpose a model of the universe based upon our understanding and knowledge of tool making.
And by the way, I'm not a panpsychist I am what I term a pragmatic physicalist.
Yes! We distinguish between law and boundary conditions because we are used to driving our own tools and machines, which are invariably open systems with adjustable knobs. We are confused by closed systems, like the whole Universe. In fact we can’t even imagine a closed system/ the whole universe: if you can see it from the outside then it’s not closed / it’s not the totality of what exists (because you are outside of it).
Good observation! This reminds me of the thought experiment about whether space is finite or infinite. You're to imagine yourself going to the edge of space and throwing a javelin outside space's boundary. Where does it go? It's hard to imagine it going anywhere except into more space. But if that's the case, you're not at the edge of space. And so on. Which suggests the universe is infinite...or space is how we experience of the world.
Arguably this paradox has been resolved by allowing a non-trivial topology for the Universe. A two-dimensional analogy would be the surface of the Earth: while not infinite, it does not have a boundary.
Yeah, I've heard about that. I don't know. Maybe I don't get the concepts, but the pictures I've seen look like they do have boundaries. Or maybe I just can't wrap my head around the idea.
Intriguing ideas. At one point, they reminded me of how some authors allow for indeterminism at quantum levels in top-down causation, which avoids deterministic claims that we couldn’t have acted otherwise. As in Kane (1996), indeterminism needn't make our choices erratic but just help randomly create options for our more deliberate levels of thinking to draw upon. Creativity and free will might thus embody an element of randomness. --Just some random thoughts stimulated by your more expansive ideas.
Hi Mostyn! "Creativity and free will might thus embody an element of randomness"—I like that idea. It does seem to me a useful dualism, determinism + "errant cause" or randomness, at least from the cosmological perspective. The two elements (which are really two sides of the same coin) combine to create "the greatest possible unity of the greatest possible diversity".
"If we assume that the mind is a non-physical entity or ‘substance,’ how could it interact with a completely different physical substance, like our brain?"
There's an embedded zombie question here, and like all zombie questions it's more about your priors than reality.
If eventually science were to conclusively prove that consciousness is completely outside science and unknowable, would you take this to mean that it exists in a supernatural realm or merely that there exists a higher level of physics that we haven't yet found a way to explore?
If the former you're a dualist, if the latter you're not, but they actually say the same thing.