Bzzzzz. Wrong answer about the most dangerous idea. Idealistic wishing upon clouds and souls is much more dangerous to human comfort, progress, and happiness. It's so infantile to hold onto such ultimately useless myths.
Hi Ed - are you aware of any scientific experiment that would provide evidence for stand-alone matter (or "physical stuff")?
I've never come across one.
Another experiment that might be useful in considering what the nature of the "external world" is:
The problem of repeated false awakenings.
(1) I "wake up," get out of bed, and see something odd (say, my window is shining with rainbow colored lights) and realize I'm dreaming.
(2) I "wake up" again, in my bed, and think, "Oh, I was dreaming, and now I'm awake." I get up, go to the bathroom and splash my face with water, go to the kitchen, and find my table has been moved and is right up against the refrigerator. I suddenly realize I"m dreaming and only thought I had woke up.
(3) I "wake up" again in my bed. Now I try to do some tests. I think rationally, going through a series of careful thoughts. I pick up a book, read a few paragraphs, and everything looks clear. I pinch myself and feel the pain. I do any number of tests and am not fully convinced I'm awake. I then "wake up" in my bed.
(4) Now I'm in the midst of a difficulty. I just did everything I could possibly think of to test my state, to determine if I'm awake or dreaming. I can't think of anything else to do.
Is there a way at this point to do further testing? I have never heard or thought of a way. The last time this happened to me, I went through 5 cycles, and the last time it occurred, I was not sure if I was awake or dreaming until about 5 minutes went by.
(by the way, Bertrand Russell, who everyone would agree, I think, was a person of more than average intelligence, had more than 50 of these false awakenings in a row, and each time, could not find a way to test if he was awake or dreaming).
OBJECTION #1: Dreams are so obviously different from waking; they're "dreaming" - that is, illogical, incoherent, things look kind of vague, etc
RESPONSE: yes, many if not most dreams are that way. But this objection, in my understanding, only holds if ALL dreams are that way. Clearly, in the sequence of false awakenings, in which one's logical, reasoning mind is fully available, and the environment looks indistinguishable from the waking environment, this is not the case.
OBJECTION #2: If you're questioning whether you're awake or dreaming, you're either psychotic or you're obviously dreaming.
RESPONSE: The fact of questioning one's state in a series of false awakenings is, to me, sufficient to refute this objection.
I think you're wrong. I'll try to explain by pointing to it.
As you know, dreams can be bizarre without you realising that they are bizarre until you wake up. By your logic, however, it may equally well be the case that in fact the opposite is true-- the dream wasn't bizarre, but you're now dreaming that it was bizarre!
Similarly, every thought, every conclusion and every belief may be confabulated into existence by whatever. If you think 'I think, therefore I am, and at least I'm conscious!', then every step there can be total delusion. As you read these words, you may be hallucinating that you've actually read this whole comment. Perhaps you haven't even read the beginning of this very sentence?
Perhaps you have no idea what you mean by drawing any conclusions at all? Perhaps the 'mind' concept is totally hallucinated, and it's not really hallucinated by a mind? Whatever you think mind means, that's invoking complex concepts, whether you realise it or not.
Thanks for your comment. I’m not sure how it relates to what i wrote, but i can’t say I disagree with you!
In any case, you’ve given me an idea, with your comment about bizarre dreams, since dreams can range from bizarre, to perfectly coherent to magisterially beautiful.
I never thought of this before, but you gave me an idea of how to make this a practical experiment, rather than just a philosophical question.
I’ve sat up in meditation and had the expeirence both of having lucid dreams AND having a series of false awakenings (that is, thinking I’ve woken up and then realized I was still dreaming).
So you only need to memorize a little of this to try it on your own, but I’ll add a bit of detail to try to make it more clear.
(1) Start by sitting up on your bed, leaning against the wall or backboard (however your bed is set up). Close your eyes and just relax.
(2) Now, open your eyes, look around, and just notice your environment, the colors, sounds, shapes, the feel of the bed, your clothing, emotions, thoughts, etc. Now imagine you suddenly realize - simply by the intuition of “knowing” your state (it can often happen this way) that you’re dreaming. Close your eyes and imagine now you’ve awoken from the dream.
(3) Repeat step 2: look around, but now get up. you’re not quite sure if you’re awake or dreaming, so you perform whatever tests you like: you tap the bed, pinch your arm, try to jump up in the air and hover, examine details in the room, pick up your phone and read the morning news or whatever. Then get back onto the bed, sitting up, and realize you’re dreaming and that you’ve just woken up and you’re meditating again.
You can do this as many times as you choose but you’ll never find any phenomenon or detail of any kind that can give you even a clue as to whether you’re dreaming or awake.
I have no idea if this would work, since it really is pretending and the whole point of the false awakening experiment is you absolutely do NOT know if you’re awake or dreaming.
I’d be curious, if you try it, if it has any power to evoke questioning of your state - waking or dreaming….
Waiting for the first real war between idealists and panpsychists lol. Or when the idealists split into three major religions with common roots and rage war upon each other.
What's detrimental to the 'soul' depends who you ask. If you're some kind of antimaterialist, you quite naturally have a (false) sense of self that you take materialists to be denying and trying to take away from you. It's a no-brainier that you're gonna think that is 'bad'.
Anyway, we should probably not judge truth by how good it feels!
Matt and Tina - what would you folks think is the most compelling argument against materialism? I think the skeptic's argument regarding the potential indistinguishability of dream and waking is the most powerful.
But comprehension of it seems to require some familiarity with lucid dreaming. We'll see what Ed has to say about it!
Hi Ricard, I see you read my comment. I'd love to hear your suggestions on arguments against materialism, also if you have any objections to my false awakening response to Ed.
Don. I really have problems to catch up with all you. I studied theoretical physics and always had an Inquisitive mind but it's thanks to Tina that recently found myself lured into those chats. Disclaimer aside lets jump in.
I won't defend materialism in any of its hues. Human history of science first lesson is humility. We are far from grasping the nature. But we learned that small steps also have its small teachings.
Following the false awakening model we learn something useful every time till something doesn't add. Then we pinch ourselves.
Materialists are in my opinion sleepyheads.
About quayum physics or Einstein space time rellativity: our senses are useless, raw math is our only grasp. Here in this awakening we don't recognize our bedroom or the starry sky. Yet still it does add.
We know there will be another dream afterwards but we still don't understand the dream we are leaving.
Meanwhile Madonna is bulding quantum cold supercomputers and trying to open black holes to oher cities to skip flights. It pays the bills of those trying to pinch themselves awake. 😉
Interesting thought. I don't think it has any relevance. You may know of Arthur Zajonc, former president of the Anthroposophical Society of America? He insisted the physics (of any kind) has nothing to say about materialism. Physics, he said, deals solely with quantities, and is silent with regard to qualities.
Ulrich Mohrhoff and Marco Masi, both published physicists (Marco has written college textbooks on quantum physics; Ulrich has a well respect non-materialist theory on how laws of nature developed, and has been published in peer reviewed physics journals) both are quite insistent that interpretations of quantum physics that claim to "prove" anything about consciousness are philosophic interpretations, not empirical scientific facts.
In all physics, quantum or otherwise, one starts with abstractions from perception (Andre Linde has some astute observations on this) and ends up with pure abstractions. The Copenhagen and other theories regarding the "collapse of the wave function" related to consciousness may have some philosophic interest but have no empirical validity from science.
As a psychological researcher, my first job was to get rid of qualitative experience and replace it with quantitative statistics. Although my research "proved" the effectiveness of mindfulness in reducing physical pain, the experiment did not strictly "measure" mindfulness - at least, not the experience of mindfulness. Psychological research (except phenomenological research, which is accepted in very very few mainstream journals) simply ignores experience.
I guess it depends what you mean by materialism. Quantum phenomena lay to rest the idea that nature is ultimately made of simply located solid bodies in empty space.
Oh, sorry. I meant the doctrine that the world is ultimately meaningless, purposeless, directionless, without consciousness, intelligence, awareness of any kind, sentience or life. And yes, you're correct. The true believers in nihilism (which is what it really is) shifted from "materialism" to "physicalism" about 100 years ago.
The nihilist, life-denying, soul crushing faith based, non empirical belief system remains the same.
I'm hoping Ed will return to tell us how he can both advocate for Abraham Maslow's theory of self actualization and a philosophic view of nihilism.
There's an interesting ambiguity in the word "materialism". The materialism in the idea of little billiard balls bouncing around in space and the materialism Madonna sang about are very different, but also similar in that both versions convey a sense of assured concreteness in opposition to intangible abstraction. Madonna's material girl wants diamonds, not empty promises.
great points - in Madonna's case, it's assured concreteness in the sense that ultimate fulfillment lies in obtaining something concrete from outside. A truly non materialistic approach to life (whether it's contrasted with billiard balls in space, quantum energy fields, or obtaining external objects in order to be happiness) finds happiness and fulfillment in self giving, love, kindness, compassion and caring, and most of all, in giving oneself wholly to the greater process of evolutionary unfolding.
Don, did you read my essay on the subject? I wouldn't dismiss quantum mechanics as irrelevant to the philosophical discussion. While quantum mechanics is indeed quite abstract, it also reveals insights that materialists strongly oppose and have a hard time coming to terms with. https://marcomasi.substack.com/p/quantum-mechanics-and-the-end-of
". It is essential to understand that this principle isn't a result of measurement errors from your measuring device (and, no, here I come to the skeptic’s defense: it isn’t influenced by your mind or consciousness"
****
The idea of a particle is only a fictitious model, a mental conceptual construct that has no counterpart in the microscopic physical reality. It makes no sense to talk about the position of a particle because the idea of a point particle is a mathematical human mental abstraction
****
If quantum mechanics is a theory without hidden variables, then the answer is: Nothing. It is just so.
*****
The major shortcoming of all these interpretations of quantum mechanics is that they don’t predict anything new. They are just different models of reality that make no testable predictions that allow us to verify them and distinguish one ontology from another. They only tell us something we already know, placing it into different ‘theaters of reality’ but mimicking the very same quantum theory without adding much that is substantially new.
******
This is also the (more sociological than scientific) reason why you will find most materialists trying to recast quantum physics in the naïve forms of human realism, while those who have a more spiritual or idealist worldview show less resistance toward the ‘spooky actions’ and quantum superposition, randomness, and the like.4 Unfortunately, the latter, especially if not professionals, falls into misunderstandings and develops pseudo-scientific theories.
****
But Nature’s message is loud and clear: “No matter how hard you try to imagine yet another ontology, no matter how long you look for yet another loophole, no matter how many times you come up with yet another interpretation: I am indeterministic, I am non-local, I am irreducible. Get over it!”
*****
(NOTE: the above are all quotes from Marco's essay)
Now, I'm not a physicist (and more than that, I somehow managed to avoid physics class altogether in high school!). But I agree with all of the above and I thought I made that clear.
I don't see how affirming that nature is non deterministic or non local, in itself, gets us any closer to a conscious, intelligent, purposeful, "final cause" embedded universe. The method of the physicist (and unfortunatlely, the method of the current psychological researcher as well) simply is too third person to allow for any fundamental shift.
Finally, Tina's point below - that laying out an argument can't change anyone's mind - is EXACTLY why I am calling for practice, not philosophic arguments.
Even the idea that science is metaphysically neutral is almost impossible to get across in a purely intellectual/argumentative/conceptual way. That's why I'm looking for a high school level (or easier) physics experiment to show in a video (probably some AI generated animation, ultimately) and STEP BY STEP SHOWING, not arguing or explaining, how the entire process involve (a) sensory experience; and (b) abtraction from experience.
Jan and I have for the last several years tended to conceive our online courses as quite separate from our "integral yoga" writing. But I'm coming to see how they may be the most important thing we're doing.
I'm continually astonished at how otherwise intelligent, even meditatively experienced people have difficulty with some of the simplest aspects of meditative awareness.
Our core practice of "Effortless mindfulness" is key to this whole science/spirituality thing, I think.
So conventional mindfulness involves attention TO experience; that is, we learn to attend differently to what we're aware OF.
Effortless mindfulness involves turning attention 'around" and noting the awareness WITHIN WHICH all experience takes place.
That only took 2 sentences but I find, even with people who have a lot of experience with conventional mindfulness, it takes anywhere from 6 months to a year to "get it."
And I remember decades ago when I first got this distinction. It was so obvious, I could hardly remember how it was possible I didn't.
And when you get it, you don't need any argument to see how utterly absurd and incoherent all the ideas about materialism and physicalism are.
“I don't see how affirming that nature is non deterministic or non local, in itself, gets us any closer to a conscious, intelligent, purposeful, "final cause" embedded universe. The method of the physicist (and unfortunatlely, the method of the current psychological researcher as well) simply is too third person to allow for any fundamental shift.”
Ok, this is a good point that I believe is worth deeper consideration. There is a fundamental difference between your approach and mine. Your approach aims for an experiential subjective experience that should trigger the "aha moment." Indeed, if successful, that would certainly be the most powerful persuasion. However, this can be a long journey that might take considerable time to realize for most, and there may be intermediate steps that could facilitate reaching that point.
This is where my approach comes in. It does not (or not necessarily) ask the reader to believe in some metaphysical truth; it only seeks to point out the false premises with which materialists deny them. It is an attempt to deconstruct several strongly held beliefs and physicalist dogmas, showing that their extrapolation is based on naive fallacies and preconceptions. Beliefs that science itself has already disproven (or not proven)! The mind can't prove anything related to metaphysics, but its greatest power lies in its ability to become aware of its own fallacies if it is honest with itself and avoids telling itself fairy tales.
In this specific case, you are correct in saying that "suggesting that nature is non-deterministic or non-local, in itself, doesn't get us any closer to a conscious, intelligent, purposeful, 'final cause' embedded universe." However, since one of the most strongly held beliefs of materialists is determinism, which supposedly doesn't allow for free will, and reductionism, which presupposes locality, disproving that determinism and locality are gone once and for all undermines one of their most sacred tenets upon which they have always based their entire reasoning.
Does this, in itself, convince them that the universe is conscious, intelligent, and purposeful? Of course not. Nonetheless, it is by undermining the basic pillars of materialism that the materialist could eventually begin to nurture some doubts. It is by instilling doubts rather than certainties that we can also begin to lead people to think more deeply and below the surface. The first step toward a deeper recognition often requires a phase of deconstructing old belief systems and unconscious assumptions that prevent us from seeing further. In this sense, I go the negative route, so to speak. I don't prove any truth; I disprove the narrative that hinders us from developing new perspectives. It is in this light that most (though not all) of my writings should be read.
Actually, there's an intermediate step: I like to focus on materialist fallacies as well, but I tend to be drawn toward focusing on the fallacies that are likely to - down the line - help support the eventual experimental shift.
In some areas, we're focusing on the same deconstruction, but you understand the scientific part of it infinitely more than I do, which is why I find your writing so helpful.
For some reason, the first time I skimmed your "End of Materialism" i liked it but didn't think it would be that helpful.
As I've attempted to respond to people on this substack and on Tina Lee's (is that her name? Sorry, I forgot) and I've seen your clarifications, I've gone back to your materialism book and am amazed to see how much better off I'd be in writing about this if I had studied it. Anyway, I already got through the first 70 pages or so and have highlighted a lot for me to summarize. LOTS! lots of good stuff.
Anyway, I feel like I'm leaping into this, but I'm trying to keep in mind it is going to be very slow going. It will likely take till the end of the year before I finish going through your 2 books, for example (I mean the materialism book and of course, "Spirit Calls Nature") while I'm also summarizing Kastrup, Hart, Taylor, Medhananda and several others.
So, all good. We need to approach this from as many angles as possible!
I think it's virtually impossible to change people's minds simply by laying out an argument. What worked for me was seeing an entire epistemological-ontological framework within which my own views were incorporated as the lower part of a greater whole, a conception I found in Plato's thought, though others may find something similar in other philosophies or religions. That acknowledgement and understanding of where I was made it possible for me to take the rest seriously, though of course my mind was already opening at that point. There is something mysteriously compelling about encountering the works of some guy writing thousands of years ago who places your views at the very bottom of his hierarchy of knowledge and being.
I couldn't agree more (well, I suppose I COULD!:>)
We'e just met and I can imagine from what you've seen of what I've written, it may seem I believe an argument is sufficient.
One reason why I keep coming back to the "false awakening" example is I remain (despite years of failure:>) that a well made animation could have an extraordinarily powerful effect on people. I can tell when I describe it verbally, people don't really "get" the power of this.
If you've ever sat up in bed, having gone through 5 or more cycles of thinking you've awoken and realize you were previously dreaming, and now sit there, with an increasing sense of dread, fear, and foreboding, slowly realizing THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO WAY AT THE MOMENT TO TELL IF YOU'RE DREAMING OR AWAKE" - it's profoundly different from any conceptual argument.
What you're experiencing at that moment - not even experiencing but viscerally SEEING _ is the inherent "emptiness' (the Buddhist sunyata) of all manifest things in the universe.
The Dalai Lama once said, if you're studying sunyata and think you understand it, and you're not terrified, you don't understand it.
I did once give a presentation where I talked about object permanence and other aspects of the world that are built up throughout the time we are infants and toddlers. I began to invite people to question their direct perception, the sense of the solidity of objects, of their own body, to question time and space, to question whether their "self" had any solidity or permanence. I think it was Jan who glanced over me and mouthed "Stop" as she realized before I did that people were getting VERY scared.
This speaks to the psychological dimensions of this. Ultimately, the belief in materialism and the "reality" of solid objects outside us is based on our intense desire and attachment to the idea that this little self composed of flotsam and jetsam of ideas, instinctive needs, sensations, emotions, etc is solid, enduring and "real."
Psychosis is one of the potential results of seeing through this before we're ready. In some ancient traditions it is said this too soon recognition can even lead to death; a heart attack at the shock of realizing our ultimate lack of inherent existence.
So yes, I'm aware it is not by argument, any more than I can treat a patient with severe depression or PTSD by "explaining" to them that 'everything is fine:>))
Maybe you should give your talk to the patients with depression and PTSD instead, since they might actually be relieved to hear this shit show isn't real.
If the construction site statement is along the lines of Carl Sagan's point that we are a way for the universe to understand itself, then I'm onboard.
Can't say I really follow the "Truth is not the conformity..." thought. I would agree that we never know if we've achieved a final theory, and it doesn't seem productive to ever assume we have.
On souls and ideas we take to be true, that's plausible. But the difficulty might be in deciding what "we take to be true" involves.
Coming from the physicalist camp, which includes matter but also energy and spacetime in its ontology, I don't take myself to be denying personhood or freedom. Although it's probably fair to say my understanding of those concepts, my theory about them, is almost certainly different from someone who does take physicalism to deny them. I think we have to be on guard against assuming we have final theories of personhood and free will.
On the truth-conformity point, I think he's alluding to our tendency to imagine we can grasp truth through reason and logic alone. We tend to assume a dichotomy between emotion and reason, but this division was not so stark in ancient thought, where desire plays a critical role in the learning process.
Tina I gotta say that despite my deep disagreements with you, I really appreciate your way of engaging with with us in the enemy camp. This is too rare, on both sides.
I don't know how to clearly cut logic and reason from desire and emotion. I think all forms of cognition, or all of the human mind, are fundamentally different aspects/parts of a greater whole. That said, I do agree we cannot appreciate life's big wonders and mysteries with the mindset of "let's calculate". Some materialists are only interested in that part, but for example dennetts materialism is a lot larger than that!
I'm curious, do you see incoherence in our view, or only that it is lacking something?
I mean functionalism more broadly, r Dennett's functionalism more specifically, whichever you prefer!
I know Philip Goff thinks Dennett's views are internally coherent and respectable and do offer coherent explanations for all the "problems". Chalmers seems to be of this position too. Yet they for some reason (which is partially understandable to me) they assign a low credence to it, and would rather work on other views despite admitting to problems with them.
None of them are Idealists though, so that's why I was curious what you say!
I have no problem with functionalism as such. After all, Aristotle was a functionalist. But there are many types of functionalism, and many functionalists these days seem to favor deterministic reductive explanations that explain away lived experience and agency rather than leaning into the much richer teleological accounts that functionalism is well poised to support.
Since my own belief system is grounded in reality/appearance metaphysics (RAM) instead of the prevailing paradigm of subject/object metaphysics (SOM), I don’t have a problem with materialism per se other than its current framework is woefully inadequate and borders on being delusional; nor do I have a problem with idealism in all of its flavors either. Is one belief system more hazardous to our mental and physical health than the other? The short answer is a definitive NO; but that’s only true if one does not drink the cyanide laced kool-aid when it’s passed around by the authorities. Both sides are guilty of being radically unreasonable.
As a pragmatic physicalist myself; I’ve resolved in my own mind that we live in, are a part of, and participate in a physical reality. And by physical I mean motion that is required for first cause that results in structure and/or form. So, with this very simple and articulate definition of what it means for something to be physical, I’ve covered every phenomena that occurs within our reality from the quantum realm to the domain of the mind. For example: is not mentation or the very process of thinking motion in action that results in a thought or idea that has taken on a form and/or structure? If the obvious answer is yes, then thoughts qualify as being physical as does everything else in our universe.
"It is a term that's wide open to interpretation!"
Now you're starting to sound like Mike, Ha.....
Since reality/appearance metaphysics (RAM) makes no ontological distinction between mind and matter, the definition and application of the term physicalism has to correspond to that monistic architecture. Physicalism has to be a word that is useful and equally, it has to be a word that can account for all of the phenomena the we experience in our world of appearances without the annoying presence of exceptions or contradictions. It may not correspond with our own biases but I do think it reflects the true nature of the reality we experience.
I'm sorry, but that's pretty misrepresentative of what many materialists are saying. Definitely Dennett. There's certainly no denying of freedom and agency and the 'magic' and wonder of our condition! We're not claiming that reality is like windows 98!
What's detrimental to the 'soul' depends who you ask, doesn't it? If you're any kind of antimaterialist, you quite naturally have a (false imho) sense of self that you take materialists to be denying and trying to take away from you. I'd course you're gonna think that is 'bad'? I felt the same! I can totally relate.
As a materialist, I genuinely perceive a lot of destruction coming out of various forms of anti-materialism. But I see good things too.
Honestly, I think Materialism sometimes is bleak. But it's given me so much more than it's taken. This is gonna be different to different people. It would turn some 'believers' psychotic, and others it would liberate (like I feel, most of the time). Besides, Buddha has you covered.
In any case, you should probably not judge the truth value of how good it feels to you? or to anyone for that matter? Or are you advocating that Materialism should be suppressed even if taken to likely be true?
I agree with him about a lot (eg, qualia is a poorly formed concept), but he certainly caricatures non-materialists in his turn (eg, Teilhard de Chardin, who he seems not to have bothered to read before dismissing him in "Darwin's Dangerous Idea").
In my answers here I am referring to the materialist nihilism that pervades much contemporary culture, where life has only the meaning individuals conjure in their heads, where values up to and including human rights are just social constructs with no deeper grounding, and where our sense of first person experience and agency is, as Dennett put it, a "user illusion." Not only do I think these views are false, they are self-evidently bad for our mental health and are symptomatic of a decadent culture not long for this world.
I think your characterization of “symptomatic of a decadent culture not long for this world” is short-sighted, misplaced and downright divisive. To be clear, I am not a disciple of Dennett, nor do I see our first person experience and agency as a “user illusion”. However, quasi spiritualists, mystics, idealist or religious people in general do not possess nor do their cherished religious traditions produce better moral character than a materialist nihilist. The killing rampage and the slaughter of innocent men, women and children in Myanmar by devote Buddhist monks a few years ago is an excellent example.
All human beings without exception conjure up meaning in their heads, where values up to and including human rights are just social constructs with no deeper grounding. And that is a cold hard fact. There is no objective, scientific morality that anyone can point to. The closest thing I’ve found to a grounding objective morality is this:
Our presence on this planet and within society is not benign, the best anyone can hope to achieve is to do the least amount of damage that one can as we pursue our own self-interests through the highest ideal of self-expression.
There is no other moral authority than the limits that we place upon ourselves as individuals. Are human beings screwed up? Absolutely! But do unfounded religious beliefs make an individual better than a materialist nihilist? Absolutely not!
That value and meaning are all in our heads is not a cold hard fact, but a metaphysical interpretation you’ve decided to accept despite the facts. Science itself rests upon a devotion to truth that either transcends what happens inside the skull or is itself just a delusion.
What are the "facts" that you are referring to because I'm a little bit confused. Are you suggesting that only the institution of science is capable of establishing facts?
No I’m saying scientific research itself, as a cultural activity, presupposes the reality of value. If it is all in our heads then there’s no such thing as scientific knowledge or truth, just delusion all the way down.
Still I agree with you to the extent that I see nihilism as an important initiatory experience. We can’t avoid confronting it as a possibility and a mature sense of cosmic meaning is only found on the far side of it, having gone through it.
Ok, that helps. Personally I'm not into the delusion all the way down business, although I'm not sure I agree with your assessment that scientific research presupposes the reality of value in the "ultimate" sense of the word.
However, my own ontological model presupposes value as the "ultimate reality" which makes value equivalent to Kant's "thing-in-itself".
If we were to consider value as the “thing-in-itself” and/or the ultimate reality, then what we are witnessing is value manifesting itself through form as it unfolds over time into different states of becoming. We see this unfolding in the evolution of the cosmos, the evolution of the biosphere and even within the evolution of our own experience of consciousness, do we not?
I don’t disagree about religious traditions being a mixed bag, of course. But the solution to ideologically driven violence isn’t more ideological violence. Nihilism kills, too.
Thanks for saying so! It's really nice to hear. And yes, I've been digging Matthew's writing for a while now too. I'm actually about halfway through his Post-Kantian book—it's very good.
I've been a fan of David's work for a little while now. Haven't read his books yet, but definitely intend to.
"There is no final theory, only the cosmos imagining itself through us in ceaseless becoming. There is no self-conscious ego who might understand the explanation, anyway."
Yes! There's a fantastic passage in Process & Reality where Whitehead makes this point, saying how there can be no complete set of all actual entities, because to encompass all actual entities would require being a further actual entity looking down upon them all, which contradicts the completeness of the set (I'm guessing David probably had this in mind). Like how there can be no "set of all sets" in mathematics. There's this inherent incompleteness to reality, and that is what gives space for freedom.
I agree about materialism, or at least its reductive forms, being incredibly destructive, both on an individual level and also socially and ecologically. When you look at the world as lifeless matter, there is nothing to do but to shape it according to your own Will. Matter is means, not end, and so materialism leads to viewing everything as a means to my ends.
Oh, if you mean what I think you mean, I totally agree with that. Dennett somewhere said "I'm ready to come out as a teleo-functionalist"!
I think the mind is more than its parts in important respects. Just as any organism is more than its cells, and a university is more than its buildings. Obviously we cannot meaningfully talk about the wonders of oaks and birches in reductive terms of cells. Crucially, we should not claim that what makes an oak different from a birch is an illusory differnce, it's "just" the genetics (or whatever). Nor should we do anything of that kind about humans or our minds. Minds are not "just" neuronal firing.
But in neither case do I see any problem with the view that the higher level phenomena (oaks, birches, viruses, humans) supervene on lower-complexity phenomena.
I see no contradiction in holding such supervenience views, and also celebrating the realness and the wonders of life and minds.
My biggest problem with anti-materialism is that almost nobody in that camp seems to admit that we should be able to find phenomena in brains which go against what physics predicts. Antimaterialism does make different predictions than Materialism! They either don't understand this point, or they just dodge it, I don't know. At least Philip Goff seems to understand and acknowledge this problem clearly.
Sorry, it took me a while to realize this comment was for me. (I find this layout confusing.)
As I understand it, supervenience just says you can't have a mental state without some change in a brain state (or whatever). I'm not sure what this is meant to explain, exactly, since it doesn't say anything about what causes what.
"My biggest problem with anti-materialism is that almost nobody in that camp seems to admit that we should be able to find phenomena in brains which go against what physics predicts."
I'm not following.
"Antimaterialism does make different predictions than Materialism!"
I don't think of "antimaterialism" as a scientific theory, so it's not necessarily intended to make predictions. It's intended to describe reality. That said, it is possible for scientists to use "antimaterialist" frameworks to do science.
No worried, thanks for following up! Yeah sorry about the mess, I make neurodivergent chaotic comments...I can't follow them myself, nor can I follow my own thoughts...
What I meant is:
Materialism: the standard model of particle physics makes correct predictions not only in particle accelerators and cloud chambers, but also in snowflake formation, toenail growth, neuronal deporalisation and anywhere else in the body. Prediction: no matter where we look here on earth, we will not find violations of the standard model. As such, we know that any high level complex phenomena supervenes on the microphysical. This does not deny the reality of high-level complex phenomena, but in an important sense everything is reducible to the mechanistic. You will never understand how trees grow or how AI works in the language of the standard model, but that doesn't make us question that it's correct. As such, when humans talk about subjective experience, this may be a wonderfully dynamic process, but all of it is ( in principle!) comes down to the evolution of a complex physical state according to the standard model. We don't need "extra stuff". ( What is matter, physics? It's just structure that can be mathematically encapsulated. That's all that is accessible to us. We cannot discern the fundamental from the simulated, or from the manifestation of something else).
"anti-materialism": this is not a theory, as you say. But all anti-materialist views unite in that an account such as the above is considered inadequate to explain consciousness. As such, unless one is the E word (e***henomenonalist), your talk about consciousness cannot be explained or predicted, in principle, merely by evolving a physical state according to the standard model. And if that's the case, then experiments should, in principle, be able to detect that "matter" isn't behaving as the standard model predicts. Perhaps such violations should in principle be detectable in brains, for example (Goffs view). Of course, this view does not predict where or what differs from the expected. So there's no particular experiment that can settle it. But the prediction should be that there are such experiments to be discovered.
This is neutral on what kind of antimaterialism you're into. If physics emerges secondary to mind, for example, then you still gotta commit to this prediction. Because otherwise the belief in the primary mind (the belief itself) is "just" a process in the evolution of a physical state, which would evolve identically if matter is fundamental. You would think the same thoughts about yourself and the world in either case.
I'm still not sure I'm following, but regarding this— "This does not deny the reality of high-level complex phenomena, but in an important sense everything is reducible to the mechanistic."—I'm not so sure that makes sense. "Everything" is a big word.
I'll give you an example from thousands of years ago, and I'll give you an example from today.
"I fancy these bones and sinews of mine would have been in Megara or Boeotia long ago, carried thither by an opinion of what was best, if I did not think it was better and nobler to endure any penalty the city may inflict rather than to escape and run away. But it is most absurd to call things of that sort causes. If anyone were to say that I could not have done what I thought proper if I had not bones and sinews and other things that I have, he would be right. But to say that those things are the cause of my doing what I do, and that I act with intelligence but not from the choice of what is best, would be an extremely careless way of talking. Whoever talks in that way is unable to make a distinction and to see that in reality a cause is one thing, and the thing without which the cause could never be a cause is quite another thing. And so it seems to me that most people, when they give the name of cause to the latter, are groping in the dark, as it were, and are giving it a name that does not belong to it. And so one man makes the earth stay below the heavens by putting a vortex about it, and another regards the earth as a flat trough supported on a foundation of air; but they do not look for the power which causes things to be now placed as it is best for them to be placed, nor do they think it has any divine force, but they think they can find a new Atlas more powerful and more immortal and more all-embracing than this, and in truth they give no thought to the good, which must embrace and hold together all things." —Plato
Q: Aren’t higher level explanations superfluous to the physics underneath?
A: Looking backwards, a system can be described with a micro-level story and one can argue the higher-level stories don’t add anything new. But explaining backwards things that already exist is not the most important thing. What’s imho critical is how much a given story facilitates the *next* interesting thing (discovery, behavior, etc.). Especially when dealing with agency, which is all about “what do I do next?”, it’s critical to not just look at explanations but at fecundity going forward (i.e., sense-making)..My proposed definition of “explanation” (and thus, the useful sense of “causation”) has this forward-looking component. Pointing out, after the fact, that a system is “nothing but” its parts is cheap; the harder and often more useful thing is to find explanations that favor the kind of understanding that leads to new interesting things, even if they are not the simplest or reductive models. And more broadly, I think that buying in to the idea that lowest level explanations are preferred and that it’s the higher level that’s superfluous is a metaphysical asymmetric choice that prevents progress on agency (while it might be ok for many other things). Indeed, because agency and cognition are hugely dependent on abstracting saliency and meaning from irrelevant microdetails of particular experiences, one can argue that in some of the most useful stories (told by scientists, or agents about their world) are the higher-level ones which *make the molecular details superfluous*.
Notice the similarities in their explanations. No one is saying the underlying physics is wrong, so they don't have to demonstrate how the underlying physics is violated. They're saying that when reductive explanations lack explanatory power, it's time to look for a higher causal explanation. Plato thinks nothing can fully be explained without going all the way to the top, to the highest cause...and I think he's onto something. If you want to understand the parts, you have to know what they're for.
Thanks Tina. I think you're misunderstanding me. Sorry for being unclear.
Plato's old English is a bit hard for me to digest*, but I generally agree with everything Michael Levin says, and certainly everything in that paragraph you quoted. I don't agree with his panpsychist "stamp" on his philosophy, but to be fair, I haven't listened or read much about that. Maybe I will agree.
I am very much against eliminative reductionist analysis. I am very much aligned with Levin there. And I agree fully with a focus on processes. This, I think, is much more in line with Dennett than you seem to realise. He was explicitly a "teleo-functionalist". His focus on the Hard Questions ("and then what happens?") is crucial for understanding consciousness. It's all about processes, and what processes and events are for. Teleological analysis is crucial. Dennett was never an eliminativist about consciousness. Nor about agency or teleology (although with caveats).
We certainly can never explain consciousness in the language of physics. (Nor can we explain the immune system in that language.)
However... If you disagree with Goff, then I really think you've put yourself in a difficult position. If the standard model holds true here on earth, including our bodies, then that model makes certain predictions. Deterministic or probabilistic doesn't really matter.
This is the, imho, problematic consequence for you: whatever you say could, in principle, be predicted by computationally evolving a physical state according to the standard model. (That doesn't mean you're "just physics" or that the standard model is a good way to understand or explain what you are, what and how you feel, etc. Certainly not.)
If your behaviour (including your speech acts) can in principle be predicted by a computer, including any anti-materialist arguments you come up with (and no matter how reasonably and skilfully), then you would come up with exactly the same arguments (or the same kinds of arguments) regardless if:
-the material is all that exists at the fundamental level
-we live in a simulation
-matter is a manifestation of mind
-panpsychism is true
-panniftyism is true
So essentially, even if you're right about idealism (I don't know what that would mean, but leave that aside), anything you say about idealism is a result of mechanical processes taking place within the matter that manifests in mind. As such, the fundamental "mind" has no causal efficacy on any expression of beliefs in idealism, not by you, nor anybody else.
Oh, that is absolutely true! We don't have privileged access to the fundamental nature of our minds, nor to the fundamental nature of reality.
I think many (most?) materialists, at least the functionalists, would agree that the physical world itself is substrate independent. Not just the mind.
The question is how much sense to make claims about an underlying fundament (mind, simulation) while also claiming that the laws of physics could hold true on earth. People like Goff seem to increasingly agree it doesn't. If the fundamental "mind" ground reality does not have causal efficacy on how the physical (structural) plays out, then any talk about the fundamental mind is not a result of any properties of the fundamental mind. If the laws of physics hold true, then everything Plato or Levin says is a result of the evolution of the physical system. Unless the laws are "violated". This is, if I'm not mistaken, the problem of causal closure.
(Causal closure is certainly not obviously true, but as far as I can see it is true as long as we don't have violations.)
I wonder if your idealism would seem true to you even if mechanical computation were demonstrated to predict the formation and development of idealism, your adoption of it, and everything you said, including your (I assume) "yes" and the following argument?
I never said minds (or a fundamental Mind) have no causal efficacy. Quite the opposite! And I never said physical laws must be violated. I'm not suggesting replacing physics with fluffy clouds. I'm saying the physical layer would be subsumed in a larger and higher framework with more causal explanatory power. If, on the other hand, you assume there is nothing above the physical layer (which you seem to be doing in evoking mechanistic causal closure), then of course you will think the physics must be violated—but that's your self-imposed theoretical restriction, not mine. Of course, it's up to you to refuse to abide any possibility of a more expansive framework. There is no inconsistency in that, though you may have to embrace perplexing conclusions that violate the beliefs we live by. Which, of course, is nothing new.
What kind perplexing conclusiona may I need to embrace?( Given that I'm intelligent enough to understand them)
If a fundamental mind has the causal efficacy that results in the laws of physics, which can be encapsulated mathematically (of else I don't see how it counts as physics), then the same physics as fundamental, or in a simulation, or whatever, gives you exactly the same results. As far as I can see, all of these scenarios are equally compatible with the physics in your body playing out the way it does. Which in turn means that they all are equally compatible with both you and me forming and expressing our beliefs. So this discussion unfolds the same way in any scenario, it is independent of the fundamental substrate, so to speak.
If you want to avoid this (in my view) weird and empty position, you need to (as fare as I can see) posit that physics doesn't unfold merely in accordance with laws that can be mathematically described. At least sometimes. In brains, for example, as Goff has found himself forced to believe.
Even if mind as fundamental is correct, even if we ignore the problem that this doesn't explain what mind is, such a theory needs to provide some sort of sketchy account for how homo sapiens comes to talk about this fundamental mind. The causal efficacy must be something more than merely giving rise to some mathematically describable physics.
I'm not sure I do see what you mean, but I think what you're saying depends on the premise of causal closure and might connect to your comment elsewhere where you said you weren’t certain you understood what that is. That’s really a key issue here, and since you seem genuinely open, I’ll do my best to explain why it's so important.
The problem is, many people have been introduced to philosophy of mind through the lens of a very niche contemporary issue and so they’ve seen very little of the greater philosophical landscape. This is resulting in a great deal of confusion and over emphasis on qualia and epiphenomenalism, especially in online discussions amongst non-professional philosophers. Reductive physicalist attacks against qualia as epiphenomenal ONLY work against some forms of dualism and panpsychism that accept the causal closure of the physical world. These arguments don't work against most forms of idealism-panpsychism. They don't even work against Cartesian substance dualism. The problem with our contemporary dualisms is that they want to preserve something of qualitative reality while also accepting the causal closure of the universe. But it’s BECAUSE they have accepted causal closure that they are forced to resign themselves to a causally impotent qualia. Causal closure + qualities = epiphenomenal qualia.
On the other hand, calling consciousness a user illusion isn’t much different. Causal closure renders anything not at the fundamental level of physics an epiphenomenon. This may seem paradoxical to you if you’ve been hearing people say otherwise, but I ask you to think about it. You may have heard that it’s practically useful to talk about things teleologically, and Sean Carroll likes to say it’s okay to call things like minds and agency "real", but metaphysically speaking, these can only be epiphenomenal. That’s just a consequence of the causal closure framework. Which means teleology isn't really teleology in this scheme; it's only a manner of talking.
One thing I want to emphasize is that causal closure is largely taken for granted in philosophy of mind. Hardly anyone challenges it. Some try to work out ways to explain some common sense view (like agency) from within it. They talk about overdetermination and causal emergence and downward causation, all the while agreeing on the causal closure of the physical world. It hardly even occurs to anyone to question this framework. But why? It’s not supported by science itself. Saying everything can in principle be reduced to physical atoms (or quantum realms) doesn’t help because the case hasn’t been made that causal closure is metaphysically necessary. What’s it for anyway? To me, it just makes everything ugly! It doesn’t help anything or solve anything. Practically we can't make use of it, it doesn't help to predict anything we care about, it creates metaphysical problems and an onerous proliferation of isms in philosophy, and it really only makes sense when it’s based on the idea it came from, which involves the rock bottom of reality amounting to fundamental bits of solid stuff.
Now here’s another thing you won’t hear too often—any form of idealism or panpsychism that does not accept the causal closure of the physical world escapes these causation problems. Sean Carroll isn't taking into account any other causal framework than his own when he says any view that isn't reductive must break the laws of physics. I don't HAVE to break the laws of physics... but it does sound like a lot of fun.
I think your view (as I understand it) on what counts as "real" and "just a way of talking", is a really common one, but really off IMHO. I think this as at the core of the issue. I disagree wholeheartedly that if causal closure and reducibility to microphysics is true, then design, purpose and free will and subjective conscious experience is not "really" real, merely an epiphenomenon. They all supervene on the initial conditions and the microphysical, but that doesn't make them any less real. Why would it? Are these the metaphysical problems you're referring to? With your perspective of what should count as "real", I do understand that you find causal closure ugly!
This is what I'd love for you to adress:
Which laws of physics do you say needn't be violated? Do you accept that the standard model of particle physics + gravity may hold true on earth? If not, do you accept that some modification of it, which can be mathematically encapsulated, holds true?
If some known or unknown math can describe the laws of physics, then what difference does it make if there is fundamental teleology behind that math or not? The particles behave exactly the same whether there is or isn't proto-agency present, don't they? A perfect mechanistic simulation of the math, but without the "real" teleology, would result in the same behaviour, right? Same math, same behaviour? How can you escape that?
If you accept this, then this is true not only for individual particles, but for any number of particles lumped together. If determinism or stochastic indeterminism that can be captured mathematically, then there is no room for the proto-agency to express itself. Any expression would arise also without the proto-agency, if the math is the same (in fundamental reality, in a simulation, in a mind).
Laws of physics are regularities that can be mathematically described. From that falls out, naturally, causal closure! (all physical events have physical causes). Put a physical state in a simulator and evolve it with some math, deterministically or with some stochasticity sprinkled over it, and causal closure is inevitable. This IS necessary if these laws are not to be violated. Unless the math suddenly changes or is overruled, in brains or elsewhere, which would break causal closure and violate the laws of physics that we agreed upon.
I am totally with you that panpsychism/idealism that doesn't accept causal closure does not face this problem. But they cannot simultaneously claim that particles (or whatever) always behave according to some (any) fixed math.
Actually, maybe I don't agree 100% 😅 because I'm not sure how much Levin and Dennett disagree? I know Levin stated they didn't agree about everything, but it's unclear to me what precisely he objects to.
To the degree I know about Levin, I'm a fan, and haven't really found anything I've read or heard objectionable, except for the label "panspsychism". But, as far as I can tell, what he means by that term is mainly that cognition, agency, goal directedness, perhaps aspects of consciousness, go "all the way down" and are absolutely permeating pretty much all aspects of life down to very simple processes. This seems very compatible with Dennett’s views.
But I'm sure you're more familiar with Levin and can perhaps point to more differences than I have spotted. I suspect there are important differences.
Anyway, I just read the paper and found it an interesting read. Death to teleophobia!
If that's all they are, it would be interesting enough, but I get the impression they're also critical theorists, concerned with themes of feminism, ecology, the rights of nature, and so on in a way that panpsychists and vitalists don't always take up.
Otherwise the term "new materialism" might be a strategic move to capitalize on the associations of the old materialism -- even as the old materialism is being renamed "physicalism" to shake off certain associations.
sure I suppose this is true of contemporary analytic panpsychists like Goff and Strawson, who rarely if ever touch on those subjects in their academic work. But Process-Relational panexperientialists have been taking up those critical themes within a broader, constructive approach for over fifty years now.
Good to know the movement has such deep roots. I hope to see more leaves and flowers! I’ve added Karen Barad’s Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter and Meaning and Jane Barrett’s Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things to my wish list.
Thanks for the article! When I hear "New Materialist" being used in this context, I can't help but think such a phrase will quickly get flattened out by the euphemism treadmill. In other words, I doubt anyone who doesn't already find panpsychism/idealism appealing will be tempted to join the cause by the new terminology.
There's another very good article that brings out the "critical theory" aspect of the movement: https://criticalposthumanism.net/new-materialisms/. I think most traditional materialists would definitely find its "pomo" vibe off-putting. They might even call it "risible." So you're right, if this is an attempt to be credible with the mainstream, it's poorly conceived. Personally I suspect "new materialisms" is a bad name for multiple reasons, but I trust the thoughts behind the movement will prove interesting.
Bzzzzz. Wrong answer about the most dangerous idea. Idealistic wishing upon clouds and souls is much more dangerous to human comfort, progress, and happiness. It's so infantile to hold onto such ultimately useless myths.
Hi Ed - are you aware of any scientific experiment that would provide evidence for stand-alone matter (or "physical stuff")?
I've never come across one.
Another experiment that might be useful in considering what the nature of the "external world" is:
The problem of repeated false awakenings.
(1) I "wake up," get out of bed, and see something odd (say, my window is shining with rainbow colored lights) and realize I'm dreaming.
(2) I "wake up" again, in my bed, and think, "Oh, I was dreaming, and now I'm awake." I get up, go to the bathroom and splash my face with water, go to the kitchen, and find my table has been moved and is right up against the refrigerator. I suddenly realize I"m dreaming and only thought I had woke up.
(3) I "wake up" again in my bed. Now I try to do some tests. I think rationally, going through a series of careful thoughts. I pick up a book, read a few paragraphs, and everything looks clear. I pinch myself and feel the pain. I do any number of tests and am not fully convinced I'm awake. I then "wake up" in my bed.
(4) Now I'm in the midst of a difficulty. I just did everything I could possibly think of to test my state, to determine if I'm awake or dreaming. I can't think of anything else to do.
Is there a way at this point to do further testing? I have never heard or thought of a way. The last time this happened to me, I went through 5 cycles, and the last time it occurred, I was not sure if I was awake or dreaming until about 5 minutes went by.
(by the way, Bertrand Russell, who everyone would agree, I think, was a person of more than average intelligence, had more than 50 of these false awakenings in a row, and each time, could not find a way to test if he was awake or dreaming).
Can you think of any way, on the last instance of my apparently "waking up" from dreaming, of determining whether I was awake or dreaming?
POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS:
OBJECTION #1: Dreams are so obviously different from waking; they're "dreaming" - that is, illogical, incoherent, things look kind of vague, etc
RESPONSE: yes, many if not most dreams are that way. But this objection, in my understanding, only holds if ALL dreams are that way. Clearly, in the sequence of false awakenings, in which one's logical, reasoning mind is fully available, and the environment looks indistinguishable from the waking environment, this is not the case.
OBJECTION #2: If you're questioning whether you're awake or dreaming, you're either psychotic or you're obviously dreaming.
RESPONSE: The fact of questioning one's state in a series of false awakenings is, to me, sufficient to refute this objection.
I think you're wrong. I'll try to explain by pointing to it.
As you know, dreams can be bizarre without you realising that they are bizarre until you wake up. By your logic, however, it may equally well be the case that in fact the opposite is true-- the dream wasn't bizarre, but you're now dreaming that it was bizarre!
Similarly, every thought, every conclusion and every belief may be confabulated into existence by whatever. If you think 'I think, therefore I am, and at least I'm conscious!', then every step there can be total delusion. As you read these words, you may be hallucinating that you've actually read this whole comment. Perhaps you haven't even read the beginning of this very sentence?
Perhaps you have no idea what you mean by drawing any conclusions at all? Perhaps the 'mind' concept is totally hallucinated, and it's not really hallucinated by a mind? Whatever you think mind means, that's invoking complex concepts, whether you realise it or not.
Hi Mark:
Thanks for your comment. I’m not sure how it relates to what i wrote, but i can’t say I disagree with you!
In any case, you’ve given me an idea, with your comment about bizarre dreams, since dreams can range from bizarre, to perfectly coherent to magisterially beautiful.
I never thought of this before, but you gave me an idea of how to make this a practical experiment, rather than just a philosophical question.
I’ve sat up in meditation and had the expeirence both of having lucid dreams AND having a series of false awakenings (that is, thinking I’ve woken up and then realized I was still dreaming).
So you only need to memorize a little of this to try it on your own, but I’ll add a bit of detail to try to make it more clear.
(1) Start by sitting up on your bed, leaning against the wall or backboard (however your bed is set up). Close your eyes and just relax.
(2) Now, open your eyes, look around, and just notice your environment, the colors, sounds, shapes, the feel of the bed, your clothing, emotions, thoughts, etc. Now imagine you suddenly realize - simply by the intuition of “knowing” your state (it can often happen this way) that you’re dreaming. Close your eyes and imagine now you’ve awoken from the dream.
(3) Repeat step 2: look around, but now get up. you’re not quite sure if you’re awake or dreaming, so you perform whatever tests you like: you tap the bed, pinch your arm, try to jump up in the air and hover, examine details in the room, pick up your phone and read the morning news or whatever. Then get back onto the bed, sitting up, and realize you’re dreaming and that you’ve just woken up and you’re meditating again.
You can do this as many times as you choose but you’ll never find any phenomenon or detail of any kind that can give you even a clue as to whether you’re dreaming or awake.
I have no idea if this would work, since it really is pretending and the whole point of the false awakening experiment is you absolutely do NOT know if you’re awake or dreaming.
I’d be curious, if you try it, if it has any power to evoke questioning of your state - waking or dreaming….
Agreed.
Waiting for the first real war between idealists and panpsychists lol. Or when the idealists split into three major religions with common roots and rage war upon each other.
What's detrimental to the 'soul' depends who you ask. If you're some kind of antimaterialist, you quite naturally have a (false) sense of self that you take materialists to be denying and trying to take away from you. It's a no-brainier that you're gonna think that is 'bad'.
Anyway, we should probably not judge truth by how good it feels!
Matt and Tina - what would you folks think is the most compelling argument against materialism? I think the skeptic's argument regarding the potential indistinguishability of dream and waking is the most powerful.
But comprehension of it seems to require some familiarity with lucid dreaming. We'll see what Ed has to say about it!
Hi Ricard, I see you read my comment. I'd love to hear your suggestions on arguments against materialism, also if you have any objections to my false awakening response to Ed.
Don. I really have problems to catch up with all you. I studied theoretical physics and always had an Inquisitive mind but it's thanks to Tina that recently found myself lured into those chats. Disclaimer aside lets jump in.
I won't defend materialism in any of its hues. Human history of science first lesson is humility. We are far from grasping the nature. But we learned that small steps also have its small teachings.
Following the false awakening model we learn something useful every time till something doesn't add. Then we pinch ourselves.
Materialists are in my opinion sleepyheads.
About quayum physics or Einstein space time rellativity: our senses are useless, raw math is our only grasp. Here in this awakening we don't recognize our bedroom or the starry sky. Yet still it does add.
We know there will be another dream afterwards but we still don't understand the dream we are leaving.
Meanwhile Madonna is bulding quantum cold supercomputers and trying to open black holes to oher cities to skip flights. It pays the bills of those trying to pinch themselves awake. 😉
Thanks Ricard - I really enjoy the poetry and humility in your comment!
Quantum physics is a pretty strong argument against materialism, no?
Interesting thought. I don't think it has any relevance. You may know of Arthur Zajonc, former president of the Anthroposophical Society of America? He insisted the physics (of any kind) has nothing to say about materialism. Physics, he said, deals solely with quantities, and is silent with regard to qualities.
Ulrich Mohrhoff and Marco Masi, both published physicists (Marco has written college textbooks on quantum physics; Ulrich has a well respect non-materialist theory on how laws of nature developed, and has been published in peer reviewed physics journals) both are quite insistent that interpretations of quantum physics that claim to "prove" anything about consciousness are philosophic interpretations, not empirical scientific facts.
In all physics, quantum or otherwise, one starts with abstractions from perception (Andre Linde has some astute observations on this) and ends up with pure abstractions. The Copenhagen and other theories regarding the "collapse of the wave function" related to consciousness may have some philosophic interest but have no empirical validity from science.
As a psychological researcher, my first job was to get rid of qualitative experience and replace it with quantitative statistics. Although my research "proved" the effectiveness of mindfulness in reducing physical pain, the experiment did not strictly "measure" mindfulness - at least, not the experience of mindfulness. Psychological research (except phenomenological research, which is accepted in very very few mainstream journals) simply ignores experience.
I guess it depends what you mean by materialism. Quantum phenomena lay to rest the idea that nature is ultimately made of simply located solid bodies in empty space.
Oh, sorry. I meant the doctrine that the world is ultimately meaningless, purposeless, directionless, without consciousness, intelligence, awareness of any kind, sentience or life. And yes, you're correct. The true believers in nihilism (which is what it really is) shifted from "materialism" to "physicalism" about 100 years ago.
The nihilist, life-denying, soul crushing faith based, non empirical belief system remains the same.
I'm hoping Ed will return to tell us how he can both advocate for Abraham Maslow's theory of self actualization and a philosophic view of nihilism.
There's an interesting ambiguity in the word "materialism". The materialism in the idea of little billiard balls bouncing around in space and the materialism Madonna sang about are very different, but also similar in that both versions convey a sense of assured concreteness in opposition to intangible abstraction. Madonna's material girl wants diamonds, not empty promises.
great points - in Madonna's case, it's assured concreteness in the sense that ultimate fulfillment lies in obtaining something concrete from outside. A truly non materialistic approach to life (whether it's contrasted with billiard balls in space, quantum energy fields, or obtaining external objects in order to be happiness) finds happiness and fulfillment in self giving, love, kindness, compassion and caring, and most of all, in giving oneself wholly to the greater process of evolutionary unfolding.
"Madonna's material girl wants diamonds, not empty promises."
:)))
Don, did you read my essay on the subject? I wouldn't dismiss quantum mechanics as irrelevant to the philosophical discussion. While quantum mechanics is indeed quite abstract, it also reveals insights that materialists strongly oppose and have a hard time coming to terms with. https://marcomasi.substack.com/p/quantum-mechanics-and-the-end-of
Here, from Marco's essay:
". It is essential to understand that this principle isn't a result of measurement errors from your measuring device (and, no, here I come to the skeptic’s defense: it isn’t influenced by your mind or consciousness"
****
The idea of a particle is only a fictitious model, a mental conceptual construct that has no counterpart in the microscopic physical reality. It makes no sense to talk about the position of a particle because the idea of a point particle is a mathematical human mental abstraction
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If quantum mechanics is a theory without hidden variables, then the answer is: Nothing. It is just so.
*****
The major shortcoming of all these interpretations of quantum mechanics is that they don’t predict anything new. They are just different models of reality that make no testable predictions that allow us to verify them and distinguish one ontology from another. They only tell us something we already know, placing it into different ‘theaters of reality’ but mimicking the very same quantum theory without adding much that is substantially new.
******
This is also the (more sociological than scientific) reason why you will find most materialists trying to recast quantum physics in the naïve forms of human realism, while those who have a more spiritual or idealist worldview show less resistance toward the ‘spooky actions’ and quantum superposition, randomness, and the like.4 Unfortunately, the latter, especially if not professionals, falls into misunderstandings and develops pseudo-scientific theories.
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But Nature’s message is loud and clear: “No matter how hard you try to imagine yet another ontology, no matter how long you look for yet another loophole, no matter how many times you come up with yet another interpretation: I am indeterministic, I am non-local, I am irreducible. Get over it!”
*****
(NOTE: the above are all quotes from Marco's essay)
Now, I'm not a physicist (and more than that, I somehow managed to avoid physics class altogether in high school!). But I agree with all of the above and I thought I made that clear.
I don't see how affirming that nature is non deterministic or non local, in itself, gets us any closer to a conscious, intelligent, purposeful, "final cause" embedded universe. The method of the physicist (and unfortunatlely, the method of the current psychological researcher as well) simply is too third person to allow for any fundamental shift.
Finally, Tina's point below - that laying out an argument can't change anyone's mind - is EXACTLY why I am calling for practice, not philosophic arguments.
Even the idea that science is metaphysically neutral is almost impossible to get across in a purely intellectual/argumentative/conceptual way. That's why I'm looking for a high school level (or easier) physics experiment to show in a video (probably some AI generated animation, ultimately) and STEP BY STEP SHOWING, not arguing or explaining, how the entire process involve (a) sensory experience; and (b) abtraction from experience.
Jan and I have for the last several years tended to conceive our online courses as quite separate from our "integral yoga" writing. But I'm coming to see how they may be the most important thing we're doing.
I'm continually astonished at how otherwise intelligent, even meditatively experienced people have difficulty with some of the simplest aspects of meditative awareness.
Our core practice of "Effortless mindfulness" is key to this whole science/spirituality thing, I think.
So conventional mindfulness involves attention TO experience; that is, we learn to attend differently to what we're aware OF.
Effortless mindfulness involves turning attention 'around" and noting the awareness WITHIN WHICH all experience takes place.
That only took 2 sentences but I find, even with people who have a lot of experience with conventional mindfulness, it takes anywhere from 6 months to a year to "get it."
And I remember decades ago when I first got this distinction. It was so obvious, I could hardly remember how it was possible I didn't.
And when you get it, you don't need any argument to see how utterly absurd and incoherent all the ideas about materialism and physicalism are.
“I don't see how affirming that nature is non deterministic or non local, in itself, gets us any closer to a conscious, intelligent, purposeful, "final cause" embedded universe. The method of the physicist (and unfortunatlely, the method of the current psychological researcher as well) simply is too third person to allow for any fundamental shift.”
Ok, this is a good point that I believe is worth deeper consideration. There is a fundamental difference between your approach and mine. Your approach aims for an experiential subjective experience that should trigger the "aha moment." Indeed, if successful, that would certainly be the most powerful persuasion. However, this can be a long journey that might take considerable time to realize for most, and there may be intermediate steps that could facilitate reaching that point.
This is where my approach comes in. It does not (or not necessarily) ask the reader to believe in some metaphysical truth; it only seeks to point out the false premises with which materialists deny them. It is an attempt to deconstruct several strongly held beliefs and physicalist dogmas, showing that their extrapolation is based on naive fallacies and preconceptions. Beliefs that science itself has already disproven (or not proven)! The mind can't prove anything related to metaphysics, but its greatest power lies in its ability to become aware of its own fallacies if it is honest with itself and avoids telling itself fairy tales.
In this specific case, you are correct in saying that "suggesting that nature is non-deterministic or non-local, in itself, doesn't get us any closer to a conscious, intelligent, purposeful, 'final cause' embedded universe." However, since one of the most strongly held beliefs of materialists is determinism, which supposedly doesn't allow for free will, and reductionism, which presupposes locality, disproving that determinism and locality are gone once and for all undermines one of their most sacred tenets upon which they have always based their entire reasoning.
Does this, in itself, convince them that the universe is conscious, intelligent, and purposeful? Of course not. Nonetheless, it is by undermining the basic pillars of materialism that the materialist could eventually begin to nurture some doubts. It is by instilling doubts rather than certainties that we can also begin to lead people to think more deeply and below the surface. The first step toward a deeper recognition often requires a phase of deconstructing old belief systems and unconscious assumptions that prevent us from seeing further. In this sense, I go the negative route, so to speak. I don't prove any truth; I disprove the narrative that hinders us from developing new perspectives. It is in this light that most (though not all) of my writings should be read.
This is very good, and a helpful clarification;
1) See the fallacies of the materialist view.
2) inspire an experiential shift.
Actually, there's an intermediate step: I like to focus on materialist fallacies as well, but I tend to be drawn toward focusing on the fallacies that are likely to - down the line - help support the eventual experimental shift.
In some areas, we're focusing on the same deconstruction, but you understand the scientific part of it infinitely more than I do, which is why I find your writing so helpful.
For some reason, the first time I skimmed your "End of Materialism" i liked it but didn't think it would be that helpful.
As I've attempted to respond to people on this substack and on Tina Lee's (is that her name? Sorry, I forgot) and I've seen your clarifications, I've gone back to your materialism book and am amazed to see how much better off I'd be in writing about this if I had studied it. Anyway, I already got through the first 70 pages or so and have highlighted a lot for me to summarize. LOTS! lots of good stuff.
Anyway, I feel like I'm leaping into this, but I'm trying to keep in mind it is going to be very slow going. It will likely take till the end of the year before I finish going through your 2 books, for example (I mean the materialism book and of course, "Spirit Calls Nature") while I'm also summarizing Kastrup, Hart, Taylor, Medhananda and several others.
So, all good. We need to approach this from as many angles as possible!
I think it's virtually impossible to change people's minds simply by laying out an argument. What worked for me was seeing an entire epistemological-ontological framework within which my own views were incorporated as the lower part of a greater whole, a conception I found in Plato's thought, though others may find something similar in other philosophies or religions. That acknowledgement and understanding of where I was made it possible for me to take the rest seriously, though of course my mind was already opening at that point. There is something mysteriously compelling about encountering the works of some guy writing thousands of years ago who places your views at the very bottom of his hierarchy of knowledge and being.
I couldn't agree more (well, I suppose I COULD!:>)
We'e just met and I can imagine from what you've seen of what I've written, it may seem I believe an argument is sufficient.
One reason why I keep coming back to the "false awakening" example is I remain (despite years of failure:>) that a well made animation could have an extraordinarily powerful effect on people. I can tell when I describe it verbally, people don't really "get" the power of this.
If you've ever sat up in bed, having gone through 5 or more cycles of thinking you've awoken and realize you were previously dreaming, and now sit there, with an increasing sense of dread, fear, and foreboding, slowly realizing THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO WAY AT THE MOMENT TO TELL IF YOU'RE DREAMING OR AWAKE" - it's profoundly different from any conceptual argument.
What you're experiencing at that moment - not even experiencing but viscerally SEEING _ is the inherent "emptiness' (the Buddhist sunyata) of all manifest things in the universe.
The Dalai Lama once said, if you're studying sunyata and think you understand it, and you're not terrified, you don't understand it.
I did once give a presentation where I talked about object permanence and other aspects of the world that are built up throughout the time we are infants and toddlers. I began to invite people to question their direct perception, the sense of the solidity of objects, of their own body, to question time and space, to question whether their "self" had any solidity or permanence. I think it was Jan who glanced over me and mouthed "Stop" as she realized before I did that people were getting VERY scared.
This speaks to the psychological dimensions of this. Ultimately, the belief in materialism and the "reality" of solid objects outside us is based on our intense desire and attachment to the idea that this little self composed of flotsam and jetsam of ideas, instinctive needs, sensations, emotions, etc is solid, enduring and "real."
Psychosis is one of the potential results of seeing through this before we're ready. In some ancient traditions it is said this too soon recognition can even lead to death; a heart attack at the shock of realizing our ultimate lack of inherent existence.
So yes, I'm aware it is not by argument, any more than I can treat a patient with severe depression or PTSD by "explaining" to them that 'everything is fine:>))
Maybe you should give your talk to the patients with depression and PTSD instead, since they might actually be relieved to hear this shit show isn't real.
Been there, done that. They tend to be among the wisest.
Next step is to design animations, immersive holographic environments, and conscious dreaming to the people who think they're normal!!:>)
Tina, I must ask - is that shit less real than their, or your, positive memories?
Its quite poetic. To think that self awareness changes what we are. But It would challenge our very porocess of learning.
If the construction site statement is along the lines of Carl Sagan's point that we are a way for the universe to understand itself, then I'm onboard.
Can't say I really follow the "Truth is not the conformity..." thought. I would agree that we never know if we've achieved a final theory, and it doesn't seem productive to ever assume we have.
On souls and ideas we take to be true, that's plausible. But the difficulty might be in deciding what "we take to be true" involves.
Coming from the physicalist camp, which includes matter but also energy and spacetime in its ontology, I don't take myself to be denying personhood or freedom. Although it's probably fair to say my understanding of those concepts, my theory about them, is almost certainly different from someone who does take physicalism to deny them. I think we have to be on guard against assuming we have final theories of personhood and free will.
Interesting line from Carl Sagan!
On the truth-conformity point, I think he's alluding to our tendency to imagine we can grasp truth through reason and logic alone. We tend to assume a dichotomy between emotion and reason, but this division was not so stark in ancient thought, where desire plays a critical role in the learning process.
Tina I gotta say that despite my deep disagreements with you, I really appreciate your way of engaging with with us in the enemy camp. This is too rare, on both sides.
I don't know how to clearly cut logic and reason from desire and emotion. I think all forms of cognition, or all of the human mind, are fundamentally different aspects/parts of a greater whole. That said, I do agree we cannot appreciate life's big wonders and mysteries with the mindset of "let's calculate". Some materialists are only interested in that part, but for example dennetts materialism is a lot larger than that!
I'm curious, do you see incoherence in our view, or only that it is lacking something?
Thanks, Mark. Which view do you mean?
I mean functionalism more broadly, r Dennett's functionalism more specifically, whichever you prefer!
I know Philip Goff thinks Dennett's views are internally coherent and respectable and do offer coherent explanations for all the "problems". Chalmers seems to be of this position too. Yet they for some reason (which is partially understandable to me) they assign a low credence to it, and would rather work on other views despite admitting to problems with them.
None of them are Idealists though, so that's why I was curious what you say!
I have no problem with functionalism as such. After all, Aristotle was a functionalist. But there are many types of functionalism, and many functionalists these days seem to favor deterministic reductive explanations that explain away lived experience and agency rather than leaning into the much richer teleological accounts that functionalism is well poised to support.
Since my own belief system is grounded in reality/appearance metaphysics (RAM) instead of the prevailing paradigm of subject/object metaphysics (SOM), I don’t have a problem with materialism per se other than its current framework is woefully inadequate and borders on being delusional; nor do I have a problem with idealism in all of its flavors either. Is one belief system more hazardous to our mental and physical health than the other? The short answer is a definitive NO; but that’s only true if one does not drink the cyanide laced kool-aid when it’s passed around by the authorities. Both sides are guilty of being radically unreasonable.
As a pragmatic physicalist myself; I’ve resolved in my own mind that we live in, are a part of, and participate in a physical reality. And by physical I mean motion that is required for first cause that results in structure and/or form. So, with this very simple and articulate definition of what it means for something to be physical, I’ve covered every phenomena that occurs within our reality from the quantum realm to the domain of the mind. For example: is not mentation or the very process of thinking motion in action that results in a thought or idea that has taken on a form and/or structure? If the obvious answer is yes, then thoughts qualify as being physical as does everything else in our universe.
You seem to be taking "physicalism" in the broader sense that Strawson did (or perhaps even broader). It is a term that's wide open to interpretation!
"It is a term that's wide open to interpretation!"
Now you're starting to sound like Mike, Ha.....
Since reality/appearance metaphysics (RAM) makes no ontological distinction between mind and matter, the definition and application of the term physicalism has to correspond to that monistic architecture. Physicalism has to be a word that is useful and equally, it has to be a word that can account for all of the phenomena the we experience in our world of appearances without the annoying presence of exceptions or contradictions. It may not correspond with our own biases but I do think it reflects the true nature of the reality we experience.
I'm sorry, but that's pretty misrepresentative of what many materialists are saying. Definitely Dennett. There's certainly no denying of freedom and agency and the 'magic' and wonder of our condition! We're not claiming that reality is like windows 98!
What's detrimental to the 'soul' depends who you ask, doesn't it? If you're any kind of antimaterialist, you quite naturally have a (false imho) sense of self that you take materialists to be denying and trying to take away from you. I'd course you're gonna think that is 'bad'? I felt the same! I can totally relate.
As a materialist, I genuinely perceive a lot of destruction coming out of various forms of anti-materialism. But I see good things too.
Honestly, I think Materialism sometimes is bleak. But it's given me so much more than it's taken. This is gonna be different to different people. It would turn some 'believers' psychotic, and others it would liberate (like I feel, most of the time). Besides, Buddha has you covered.
In any case, you should probably not judge the truth value of how good it feels to you? or to anyone for that matter? Or are you advocating that Materialism should be suppressed even if taken to likely be true?
I grant that it is all too easy to caricature materialists, and that my short answers to these questions may have done so. I treat Dennett and the varieties of eliminative materialism in this article: https://footnotes2plato.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/segall_ptsc_7_1_105-131.pdf
I agree with him about a lot (eg, qualia is a poorly formed concept), but he certainly caricatures non-materialists in his turn (eg, Teilhard de Chardin, who he seems not to have bothered to read before dismissing him in "Darwin's Dangerous Idea").
In my answers here I am referring to the materialist nihilism that pervades much contemporary culture, where life has only the meaning individuals conjure in their heads, where values up to and including human rights are just social constructs with no deeper grounding, and where our sense of first person experience and agency is, as Dennett put it, a "user illusion." Not only do I think these views are false, they are self-evidently bad for our mental health and are symptomatic of a decadent culture not long for this world.
Matthew,
I think your characterization of “symptomatic of a decadent culture not long for this world” is short-sighted, misplaced and downright divisive. To be clear, I am not a disciple of Dennett, nor do I see our first person experience and agency as a “user illusion”. However, quasi spiritualists, mystics, idealist or religious people in general do not possess nor do their cherished religious traditions produce better moral character than a materialist nihilist. The killing rampage and the slaughter of innocent men, women and children in Myanmar by devote Buddhist monks a few years ago is an excellent example.
All human beings without exception conjure up meaning in their heads, where values up to and including human rights are just social constructs with no deeper grounding. And that is a cold hard fact. There is no objective, scientific morality that anyone can point to. The closest thing I’ve found to a grounding objective morality is this:
Our presence on this planet and within society is not benign, the best anyone can hope to achieve is to do the least amount of damage that one can as we pursue our own self-interests through the highest ideal of self-expression.
There is no other moral authority than the limits that we place upon ourselves as individuals. Are human beings screwed up? Absolutely! But do unfounded religious beliefs make an individual better than a materialist nihilist? Absolutely not!
That value and meaning are all in our heads is not a cold hard fact, but a metaphysical interpretation you’ve decided to accept despite the facts. Science itself rests upon a devotion to truth that either transcends what happens inside the skull or is itself just a delusion.
What are the "facts" that you are referring to because I'm a little bit confused. Are you suggesting that only the institution of science is capable of establishing facts?
No I’m saying scientific research itself, as a cultural activity, presupposes the reality of value. If it is all in our heads then there’s no such thing as scientific knowledge or truth, just delusion all the way down.
Still I agree with you to the extent that I see nihilism as an important initiatory experience. We can’t avoid confronting it as a possibility and a mature sense of cosmic meaning is only found on the far side of it, having gone through it.
Ok, that helps. Personally I'm not into the delusion all the way down business, although I'm not sure I agree with your assessment that scientific research presupposes the reality of value in the "ultimate" sense of the word.
However, my own ontological model presupposes value as the "ultimate reality" which makes value equivalent to Kant's "thing-in-itself".
Here is a comment I made on a previous post:
If we were to consider value as the “thing-in-itself” and/or the ultimate reality, then what we are witnessing is value manifesting itself through form as it unfolds over time into different states of becoming. We see this unfolding in the evolution of the cosmos, the evolution of the biosphere and even within the evolution of our own experience of consciousness, do we not?
I don’t disagree about religious traditions being a mixed bag, of course. But the solution to ideologically driven violence isn’t more ideological violence. Nihilism kills, too.
Great to see you two doing a collaboration. I have been following both of you for years.
Thanks for saying so! It's really nice to hear. And yes, I've been digging Matthew's writing for a while now too. I'm actually about halfway through his Post-Kantian book—it's very good.
I've been a fan of David's work for a little while now. Haven't read his books yet, but definitely intend to.
"There is no final theory, only the cosmos imagining itself through us in ceaseless becoming. There is no self-conscious ego who might understand the explanation, anyway."
Yes! There's a fantastic passage in Process & Reality where Whitehead makes this point, saying how there can be no complete set of all actual entities, because to encompass all actual entities would require being a further actual entity looking down upon them all, which contradicts the completeness of the set (I'm guessing David probably had this in mind). Like how there can be no "set of all sets" in mathematics. There's this inherent incompleteness to reality, and that is what gives space for freedom.
I agree about materialism, or at least its reductive forms, being incredibly destructive, both on an individual level and also socially and ecologically. When you look at the world as lifeless matter, there is nothing to do but to shape it according to your own Will. Matter is means, not end, and so materialism leads to viewing everything as a means to my ends.
Oh, if you mean what I think you mean, I totally agree with that. Dennett somewhere said "I'm ready to come out as a teleo-functionalist"!
I think the mind is more than its parts in important respects. Just as any organism is more than its cells, and a university is more than its buildings. Obviously we cannot meaningfully talk about the wonders of oaks and birches in reductive terms of cells. Crucially, we should not claim that what makes an oak different from a birch is an illusory differnce, it's "just" the genetics (or whatever). Nor should we do anything of that kind about humans or our minds. Minds are not "just" neuronal firing.
But in neither case do I see any problem with the view that the higher level phenomena (oaks, birches, viruses, humans) supervene on lower-complexity phenomena.
I see no contradiction in holding such supervenience views, and also celebrating the realness and the wonders of life and minds.
My biggest problem with anti-materialism is that almost nobody in that camp seems to admit that we should be able to find phenomena in brains which go against what physics predicts. Antimaterialism does make different predictions than Materialism! They either don't understand this point, or they just dodge it, I don't know. At least Philip Goff seems to understand and acknowledge this problem clearly.
Sorry, it took me a while to realize this comment was for me. (I find this layout confusing.)
As I understand it, supervenience just says you can't have a mental state without some change in a brain state (or whatever). I'm not sure what this is meant to explain, exactly, since it doesn't say anything about what causes what.
"My biggest problem with anti-materialism is that almost nobody in that camp seems to admit that we should be able to find phenomena in brains which go against what physics predicts."
I'm not following.
"Antimaterialism does make different predictions than Materialism!"
I don't think of "antimaterialism" as a scientific theory, so it's not necessarily intended to make predictions. It's intended to describe reality. That said, it is possible for scientists to use "antimaterialist" frameworks to do science.
No worried, thanks for following up! Yeah sorry about the mess, I make neurodivergent chaotic comments...I can't follow them myself, nor can I follow my own thoughts...
What I meant is:
Materialism: the standard model of particle physics makes correct predictions not only in particle accelerators and cloud chambers, but also in snowflake formation, toenail growth, neuronal deporalisation and anywhere else in the body. Prediction: no matter where we look here on earth, we will not find violations of the standard model. As such, we know that any high level complex phenomena supervenes on the microphysical. This does not deny the reality of high-level complex phenomena, but in an important sense everything is reducible to the mechanistic. You will never understand how trees grow or how AI works in the language of the standard model, but that doesn't make us question that it's correct. As such, when humans talk about subjective experience, this may be a wonderfully dynamic process, but all of it is ( in principle!) comes down to the evolution of a complex physical state according to the standard model. We don't need "extra stuff". ( What is matter, physics? It's just structure that can be mathematically encapsulated. That's all that is accessible to us. We cannot discern the fundamental from the simulated, or from the manifestation of something else).
"anti-materialism": this is not a theory, as you say. But all anti-materialist views unite in that an account such as the above is considered inadequate to explain consciousness. As such, unless one is the E word (e***henomenonalist), your talk about consciousness cannot be explained or predicted, in principle, merely by evolving a physical state according to the standard model. And if that's the case, then experiments should, in principle, be able to detect that "matter" isn't behaving as the standard model predicts. Perhaps such violations should in principle be detectable in brains, for example (Goffs view). Of course, this view does not predict where or what differs from the expected. So there's no particular experiment that can settle it. But the prediction should be that there are such experiments to be discovered.
This is neutral on what kind of antimaterialism you're into. If physics emerges secondary to mind, for example, then you still gotta commit to this prediction. Because otherwise the belief in the primary mind (the belief itself) is "just" a process in the evolution of a physical state, which would evolve identically if matter is fundamental. You would think the same thoughts about yourself and the world in either case.
Of course,
I'm still not sure I'm following, but regarding this— "This does not deny the reality of high-level complex phenomena, but in an important sense everything is reducible to the mechanistic."—I'm not so sure that makes sense. "Everything" is a big word.
I'll give you an example from thousands of years ago, and I'll give you an example from today.
"I fancy these bones and sinews of mine would have been in Megara or Boeotia long ago, carried thither by an opinion of what was best, if I did not think it was better and nobler to endure any penalty the city may inflict rather than to escape and run away. But it is most absurd to call things of that sort causes. If anyone were to say that I could not have done what I thought proper if I had not bones and sinews and other things that I have, he would be right. But to say that those things are the cause of my doing what I do, and that I act with intelligence but not from the choice of what is best, would be an extremely careless way of talking. Whoever talks in that way is unable to make a distinction and to see that in reality a cause is one thing, and the thing without which the cause could never be a cause is quite another thing. And so it seems to me that most people, when they give the name of cause to the latter, are groping in the dark, as it were, and are giving it a name that does not belong to it. And so one man makes the earth stay below the heavens by putting a vortex about it, and another regards the earth as a flat trough supported on a foundation of air; but they do not look for the power which causes things to be now placed as it is best for them to be placed, nor do they think it has any divine force, but they think they can find a new Atlas more powerful and more immortal and more all-embracing than this, and in truth they give no thought to the good, which must embrace and hold together all things." —Plato
Q: Aren’t higher level explanations superfluous to the physics underneath?
A: Looking backwards, a system can be described with a micro-level story and one can argue the higher-level stories don’t add anything new. But explaining backwards things that already exist is not the most important thing. What’s imho critical is how much a given story facilitates the *next* interesting thing (discovery, behavior, etc.). Especially when dealing with agency, which is all about “what do I do next?”, it’s critical to not just look at explanations but at fecundity going forward (i.e., sense-making)..My proposed definition of “explanation” (and thus, the useful sense of “causation”) has this forward-looking component. Pointing out, after the fact, that a system is “nothing but” its parts is cheap; the harder and often more useful thing is to find explanations that favor the kind of understanding that leads to new interesting things, even if they are not the simplest or reductive models. And more broadly, I think that buying in to the idea that lowest level explanations are preferred and that it’s the higher level that’s superfluous is a metaphysical asymmetric choice that prevents progress on agency (while it might be ok for many other things). Indeed, because agency and cognition are hugely dependent on abstracting saliency and meaning from irrelevant microdetails of particular experiences, one can argue that in some of the most useful stories (told by scientists, or agents about their world) are the higher-level ones which *make the molecular details superfluous*.
—Michael Levin, biologist
https://thoughtforms.life/qa-from-the-internet-and-recent-presentations/
Notice the similarities in their explanations. No one is saying the underlying physics is wrong, so they don't have to demonstrate how the underlying physics is violated. They're saying that when reductive explanations lack explanatory power, it's time to look for a higher causal explanation. Plato thinks nothing can fully be explained without going all the way to the top, to the highest cause...and I think he's onto something. If you want to understand the parts, you have to know what they're for.
Thanks Tina. I think you're misunderstanding me. Sorry for being unclear.
Plato's old English is a bit hard for me to digest*, but I generally agree with everything Michael Levin says, and certainly everything in that paragraph you quoted. I don't agree with his panpsychist "stamp" on his philosophy, but to be fair, I haven't listened or read much about that. Maybe I will agree.
I am very much against eliminative reductionist analysis. I am very much aligned with Levin there. And I agree fully with a focus on processes. This, I think, is much more in line with Dennett than you seem to realise. He was explicitly a "teleo-functionalist". His focus on the Hard Questions ("and then what happens?") is crucial for understanding consciousness. It's all about processes, and what processes and events are for. Teleological analysis is crucial. Dennett was never an eliminativist about consciousness. Nor about agency or teleology (although with caveats).
We certainly can never explain consciousness in the language of physics. (Nor can we explain the immune system in that language.)
However... If you disagree with Goff, then I really think you've put yourself in a difficult position. If the standard model holds true here on earth, including our bodies, then that model makes certain predictions. Deterministic or probabilistic doesn't really matter.
This is the, imho, problematic consequence for you: whatever you say could, in principle, be predicted by computationally evolving a physical state according to the standard model. (That doesn't mean you're "just physics" or that the standard model is a good way to understand or explain what you are, what and how you feel, etc. Certainly not.)
If your behaviour (including your speech acts) can in principle be predicted by a computer, including any anti-materialist arguments you come up with (and no matter how reasonably and skilfully), then you would come up with exactly the same arguments (or the same kinds of arguments) regardless if:
-the material is all that exists at the fundamental level
-we live in a simulation
-matter is a manifestation of mind
-panpsychism is true
-panniftyism is true
So essentially, even if you're right about idealism (I don't know what that would mean, but leave that aside), anything you say about idealism is a result of mechanical processes taking place within the matter that manifests in mind. As such, the fundamental "mind" has no causal efficacy on any expression of beliefs in idealism, not by you, nor anybody else.
Or what am I missing?
*joke
Your materialism would seem right to you even if mind is the cause of all things.
Oh, that is absolutely true! We don't have privileged access to the fundamental nature of our minds, nor to the fundamental nature of reality.
I think many (most?) materialists, at least the functionalists, would agree that the physical world itself is substrate independent. Not just the mind.
The question is how much sense to make claims about an underlying fundament (mind, simulation) while also claiming that the laws of physics could hold true on earth. People like Goff seem to increasingly agree it doesn't. If the fundamental "mind" ground reality does not have causal efficacy on how the physical (structural) plays out, then any talk about the fundamental mind is not a result of any properties of the fundamental mind. If the laws of physics hold true, then everything Plato or Levin says is a result of the evolution of the physical system. Unless the laws are "violated". This is, if I'm not mistaken, the problem of causal closure.
(Causal closure is certainly not obviously true, but as far as I can see it is true as long as we don't have violations.)
I wonder if your idealism would seem true to you even if mechanical computation were demonstrated to predict the formation and development of idealism, your adoption of it, and everything you said, including your (I assume) "yes" and the following argument?
I never said minds (or a fundamental Mind) have no causal efficacy. Quite the opposite! And I never said physical laws must be violated. I'm not suggesting replacing physics with fluffy clouds. I'm saying the physical layer would be subsumed in a larger and higher framework with more causal explanatory power. If, on the other hand, you assume there is nothing above the physical layer (which you seem to be doing in evoking mechanistic causal closure), then of course you will think the physics must be violated—but that's your self-imposed theoretical restriction, not mine. Of course, it's up to you to refuse to abide any possibility of a more expansive framework. There is no inconsistency in that, though you may have to embrace perplexing conclusions that violate the beliefs we live by. Which, of course, is nothing new.
What kind perplexing conclusiona may I need to embrace?( Given that I'm intelligent enough to understand them)
If a fundamental mind has the causal efficacy that results in the laws of physics, which can be encapsulated mathematically (of else I don't see how it counts as physics), then the same physics as fundamental, or in a simulation, or whatever, gives you exactly the same results. As far as I can see, all of these scenarios are equally compatible with the physics in your body playing out the way it does. Which in turn means that they all are equally compatible with both you and me forming and expressing our beliefs. So this discussion unfolds the same way in any scenario, it is independent of the fundamental substrate, so to speak.
If you want to avoid this (in my view) weird and empty position, you need to (as fare as I can see) posit that physics doesn't unfold merely in accordance with laws that can be mathematically described. At least sometimes. In brains, for example, as Goff has found himself forced to believe.
Even if mind as fundamental is correct, even if we ignore the problem that this doesn't explain what mind is, such a theory needs to provide some sort of sketchy account for how homo sapiens comes to talk about this fundamental mind. The causal efficacy must be something more than merely giving rise to some mathematically describable physics.
Do you see what I mean?
I'm not sure I do see what you mean, but I think what you're saying depends on the premise of causal closure and might connect to your comment elsewhere where you said you weren’t certain you understood what that is. That’s really a key issue here, and since you seem genuinely open, I’ll do my best to explain why it's so important.
The problem is, many people have been introduced to philosophy of mind through the lens of a very niche contemporary issue and so they’ve seen very little of the greater philosophical landscape. This is resulting in a great deal of confusion and over emphasis on qualia and epiphenomenalism, especially in online discussions amongst non-professional philosophers. Reductive physicalist attacks against qualia as epiphenomenal ONLY work against some forms of dualism and panpsychism that accept the causal closure of the physical world. These arguments don't work against most forms of idealism-panpsychism. They don't even work against Cartesian substance dualism. The problem with our contemporary dualisms is that they want to preserve something of qualitative reality while also accepting the causal closure of the universe. But it’s BECAUSE they have accepted causal closure that they are forced to resign themselves to a causally impotent qualia. Causal closure + qualities = epiphenomenal qualia.
On the other hand, calling consciousness a user illusion isn’t much different. Causal closure renders anything not at the fundamental level of physics an epiphenomenon. This may seem paradoxical to you if you’ve been hearing people say otherwise, but I ask you to think about it. You may have heard that it’s practically useful to talk about things teleologically, and Sean Carroll likes to say it’s okay to call things like minds and agency "real", but metaphysically speaking, these can only be epiphenomenal. That’s just a consequence of the causal closure framework. Which means teleology isn't really teleology in this scheme; it's only a manner of talking.
One thing I want to emphasize is that causal closure is largely taken for granted in philosophy of mind. Hardly anyone challenges it. Some try to work out ways to explain some common sense view (like agency) from within it. They talk about overdetermination and causal emergence and downward causation, all the while agreeing on the causal closure of the physical world. It hardly even occurs to anyone to question this framework. But why? It’s not supported by science itself. Saying everything can in principle be reduced to physical atoms (or quantum realms) doesn’t help because the case hasn’t been made that causal closure is metaphysically necessary. What’s it for anyway? To me, it just makes everything ugly! It doesn’t help anything or solve anything. Practically we can't make use of it, it doesn't help to predict anything we care about, it creates metaphysical problems and an onerous proliferation of isms in philosophy, and it really only makes sense when it’s based on the idea it came from, which involves the rock bottom of reality amounting to fundamental bits of solid stuff.
Now here’s another thing you won’t hear too often—any form of idealism or panpsychism that does not accept the causal closure of the physical world escapes these causation problems. Sean Carroll isn't taking into account any other causal framework than his own when he says any view that isn't reductive must break the laws of physics. I don't HAVE to break the laws of physics... but it does sound like a lot of fun.
Thank's Tina!
A few things:
I think your view (as I understand it) on what counts as "real" and "just a way of talking", is a really common one, but really off IMHO. I think this as at the core of the issue. I disagree wholeheartedly that if causal closure and reducibility to microphysics is true, then design, purpose and free will and subjective conscious experience is not "really" real, merely an epiphenomenon. They all supervene on the initial conditions and the microphysical, but that doesn't make them any less real. Why would it? Are these the metaphysical problems you're referring to? With your perspective of what should count as "real", I do understand that you find causal closure ugly!
This is what I'd love for you to adress:
Which laws of physics do you say needn't be violated? Do you accept that the standard model of particle physics + gravity may hold true on earth? If not, do you accept that some modification of it, which can be mathematically encapsulated, holds true?
If some known or unknown math can describe the laws of physics, then what difference does it make if there is fundamental teleology behind that math or not? The particles behave exactly the same whether there is or isn't proto-agency present, don't they? A perfect mechanistic simulation of the math, but without the "real" teleology, would result in the same behaviour, right? Same math, same behaviour? How can you escape that?
If you accept this, then this is true not only for individual particles, but for any number of particles lumped together. If determinism or stochastic indeterminism that can be captured mathematically, then there is no room for the proto-agency to express itself. Any expression would arise also without the proto-agency, if the math is the same (in fundamental reality, in a simulation, in a mind).
Laws of physics are regularities that can be mathematically described. From that falls out, naturally, causal closure! (all physical events have physical causes). Put a physical state in a simulator and evolve it with some math, deterministically or with some stochasticity sprinkled over it, and causal closure is inevitable. This IS necessary if these laws are not to be violated. Unless the math suddenly changes or is overruled, in brains or elsewhere, which would break causal closure and violate the laws of physics that we agreed upon.
I am totally with you that panpsychism/idealism that doesn't accept causal closure does not face this problem. But they cannot simultaneously claim that particles (or whatever) always behave according to some (any) fixed math.
BTW, I just came across this paper that you might find interesting, as it's by Michael Levin and Daniel Dennett :
https://aeon.co/essays/how-to-understand-cells-tissues-and-organisms-as-agents-with-agendas
I saw that paper in Levin's post here https://thoughtforms.life/farewell-dan-dennett-i-will-really-miss-you/ but I've not read it yet, thank you for the reminder!
Thanks for sharing that post. It’s a lovely piece, and a reminder that it is possible to admire and collaborate with those you disagree with.
I agree 100%. Did you read their paper? What did you think of it?
Actually, maybe I don't agree 100% 😅 because I'm not sure how much Levin and Dennett disagree? I know Levin stated they didn't agree about everything, but it's unclear to me what precisely he objects to.
To the degree I know about Levin, I'm a fan, and haven't really found anything I've read or heard objectionable, except for the label "panspsychism". But, as far as I can tell, what he means by that term is mainly that cognition, agency, goal directedness, perhaps aspects of consciousness, go "all the way down" and are absolutely permeating pretty much all aspects of life down to very simple processes. This seems very compatible with Dennett’s views.
But I'm sure you're more familiar with Levin and can perhaps point to more differences than I have spotted. I suspect there are important differences.
Anyway, I just read the paper and found it an interesting read. Death to teleophobia!
Apparently there is a school of thought called New Materialisms that has been getting into similar areas for years, for example in the work of Jane Bennett (2010) and Karen Barad (2007), I found a good summary at https://medium.com/philosophytoday/the-agency-of-matter-exploring-new-materialisms-b9b2be8377af.
I just found about this by accident the other day, and now I have a whole lot of reading to do. Has anyone else bumped into the New Materialists?
Yes the “new” materialists are really vitalists and panpsychists
If that's all they are, it would be interesting enough, but I get the impression they're also critical theorists, concerned with themes of feminism, ecology, the rights of nature, and so on in a way that panpsychists and vitalists don't always take up.
Otherwise the term "new materialism" might be a strategic move to capitalize on the associations of the old materialism -- even as the old materialism is being renamed "physicalism" to shake off certain associations.
sure I suppose this is true of contemporary analytic panpsychists like Goff and Strawson, who rarely if ever touch on those subjects in their academic work. But Process-Relational panexperientialists have been taking up those critical themes within a broader, constructive approach for over fifty years now.
Good to know the movement has such deep roots. I hope to see more leaves and flowers! I’ve added Karen Barad’s Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter and Meaning and Jane Barrett’s Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things to my wish list.
Thanks for the article! When I hear "New Materialist" being used in this context, I can't help but think such a phrase will quickly get flattened out by the euphemism treadmill. In other words, I doubt anyone who doesn't already find panpsychism/idealism appealing will be tempted to join the cause by the new terminology.
There's another very good article that brings out the "critical theory" aspect of the movement: https://criticalposthumanism.net/new-materialisms/. I think most traditional materialists would definitely find its "pomo" vibe off-putting. They might even call it "risible." So you're right, if this is an attempt to be credible with the mainstream, it's poorly conceived. Personally I suspect "new materialisms" is a bad name for multiple reasons, but I trust the thoughts behind the movement will prove interesting.