My overall impression is Descartes puts a unique amount of trust in introspection. He doubts everything but what he perceives in his own mind. Does that count as "infallible"? I don't know since he doesn't appear to use these words. It seems like a matter of judgment. But I can see why so many have that take.
Regarding his focus on mathematical knowledge, I do think he overlooks the importance of testing these precise conceptions empirically (that is, with conscious experience). But that's probably why he's usually regarded more as a philosopher than a scientist.
It does seem true that he isn't preoccupied with qualia, but that focus strikes me as something that developed in the 20th century, maybe starting with the sense data theorists. Although I guess an argument could be made that it goes back to C.S. Peirce in 1866. It seems like it could be a reaction to psychology and its exploration of the unconscious mind, and later the development of computing technology. But I might be all wet on this.
Usually when Descartes is criticized for believing introspection is infallible, the discussion is specifically about whether the qualities that make up the majority of our ordinary experience are to be trusted (like in that Dennett paper, "Quining Qualia"). Descartes didn't have the word "qualia", of course, but he does talk about qualities such as heat and cold and he singles them out as decidedly not "clear and distinct". He doesn't think heat and cold are intrinsic or infallibly known, but questions whether they are real properties (meaning properties of the external world). It doesn't occur to him to think about whether they might count for something simply by virtue of being experienced; in his view, qualitative experience isn't any sort of reality at all since it gives us no knowledge of the external world.
Now you could say his whole system of doubt is a kind of trust in his own mind. But ordinary experience never recovers from his skepticism. In the end, nothing in normal everyday experience can be trusted.
"Regarding his focus on mathematical knowledge, I do think he overlooks the importance of testing these precise conceptions empirically (that is, with conscious experience). But that's probably why he's usually regarded more as a philosopher than a scientist."
I'm not sure I get what you mean.
One thing to note is that here in this work, Descartes is trying to establish an a priori foundation for science. Today most people in both science and philosophy regard this attempt as both a failure and as unnecessary for science; science doesn't need a secure a priori foundation to establish scientific laws and principles (that's what Descartes is ultimately trying to justify here). But elsewhere, Descartes isn't against experimentation. "Experiment plays no role in Descartes’ deduction of the laws of nature. However, this does not mean that experiment plays no role in Cartesian science." —from SEP.
Honestly I don't know much about Descartes' scientific work. I did find this interesting example in which he uses experimentation to find the causes of a rainbow:
Our current fascination with "qualia" is peculiar to me. I haven't looked into the matter much, but I suspect you're right that it comes from some notion of 'sensory data—that's why I have a problem with talking about qualities we experience as 'qualia'. We don't actually experience sensory data (except insofar as we experience qualia as a theory about irreducible qualities). It's really funny because this notion that everything can be broken down into irreducible simples is so very much in line with Cartesian thinking (which I didn't talk about here...it's more obvious in Discourse on Method.)
Good point. He does privilege introspection, but not in the way it's usually done in contemporary debates. Ironically, his introspective judgments about what's trustworthy and what isn't are different from contemporary philosophers. Dennett and the others are projecting the more contemporary notions back unto him, always a danger with historical writers.
"I'm not sure I get what you mean."
I just meant that his focus in this work on precise ideas is incomplete in terms of how science is conducted. The actual observation is crucial. Although I did forget that he did experimentation himself.
I don't know much about that scientific work either. I did read that his notion about the pineal gland was based on actual examination of brains. And someone I read revealed that he dissected animals while they were still alive, believing it was okay since he didn't believe they were conscious. (Which seemed to put a lot of faith in his own reasoning.)
"that's why I have a problem with talking about qualities we experience as 'qualia'."
You see a difference between them? I pretty much assumed they were synonymous. But that's the problem with terms like "qualia" or "phenomenal properties". It's never clear what someone means when they use them. And any precise clarification is usually denied as not the correct meaning. It's one reason why I personally try not to use the terms, unless talking about other people's use of them.
"someone I read revealed that he dissected animals while they were still alive, believing it was okay since he didn't believe they were conscious."
So horrible. It's astounding to me that anyone could think animals aren't conscious.
On qualia vs. qualities, yeah, I do think they're different, although I don't think everyone realizes they're different. I think because of the way philosophers talk about qualia, as "what it's like", followed by examples like "to smell a rose", many people think they're just talking about experiencing qualities in an everyday, loose sense, and—to make things even more complicated—sometimes that is all they mean. But other times they use the word in a technical sense, like when they talk about experiences being irreducible or subjective. To me, that characterization is loaded with theoretical commitments, probably derived from the old rationalist-empiricist divide, which relates experiences to 'sense data'. 'Qualia' in this sense doesn't capture ordinary everyday experience, then. When I experience the smell of a rose, I experience the smell of a rose IN a rose, and the rose lives in a world with many other things which others can experience too. I don't experience the smell of a rose as something isolated or private or subjective. If I'm with someone, I'll say, "Smell this. Isn't it lovely?" It's more complicated than this, of course, but essentially what I'm saying is, the public nature of experience is the default. Private qualia is not the default.
Now, I'm not saying science as we understand it today is in a great position to understand qualitative experiences either. So by "public" I don't mean "scientifically accessible", but I realize that's what most people mean these days, which is why I'm pointing this out. I don't equate 'science' with 'public'. By 'public' I just mean our ordinary experience of the world is of a world we share with others. In our ordinary lives, we don't normally experience the world as private or subjective. (I think we'd be miserable, constantly on the verge of committing suicide, if that were the case.)
"But that's the problem with terms like "qualia" or "phenomenal properties". It's never clear what someone means when they use them."
Yeah, I agree. I think it's best to just ask, if possible. I think many people really do just mean qualities or experience in a loose sense.
Your distinction between "qualia" and "qualities" reminds me of David Chalmers' 1995 distinction between "consciousness" and "awareness". He saw "awareness" as referring to functionality, but "consciousness" as referring to the more loaded concept, the one that has the hard problem. I thought it was an interesting definitional proposal, but it sounds like most philosophers didn't take it up.
Both distinctions seem similar to mine between manifest and fundamental consciousness. I think your "qualities" is close to my "manifest qualia" while your "qualia" matches my "fundamental qualia". Although I see the lighter "manifest" version as something science can study.
But I should ask, what prevents qualities, in the sense you're using, from being studied by science? The stronger notion has fundamental ineffability and privacy as obstacles. But if qualities don't have those aspects, then what's the obstacle (or obstacles) for third party observation?
"I think it's best to just ask, if possible."
Unfortunately, not everyone is able or willing to clarify, or understands the distinction. And it's not unusual for the clarification request to be regarded as deliberate obtuseness.
That's interesting about the Chalmers distinction, because I was thinking about those terms myself over the past few days. I think "consciousness" is a very confusing term and I'm beginning to wonder if we're having problems communicating because of it.
What prevents science from understanding experience? See all of the above on Descartes. When he drew a sharp line between the qualitative and quantitative and made it clear only the latter can pertain to objective reality, that was only the beginning. What I'm describing as lived experience is probably what you (and Sellars) are calling the "manifest" image. This manifest image is considered illusory or largely illusory from the point of view of the scientific mindset ("folk psychology"), which is why science won't attempt to take it seriously, even though science grows out of and depends on it. (For instance, Descartes' mathematically extended substance is, when you think about it, dependent on supposedly non-veridical perceptual experiences like that of color, otherwise there's nothing to measure and no way to measure it.) Are these frameworks reconcilable? I don't know. But I don't think redefining the "manifest" in scientific terms will prove satisfactory. And of course I think it says something that the scientific grows out of and depends on the manifest.
"not everyone is able or willing to clarify, or understands the distinction."
I can see that. Not sure there's a great way to deal with the problem in those situations. Of course, we all get emotionally attached to our pet theories, and sometimes unfortunate terminology comes along for the ride. I think we'll be hearing about qualia for a long time yet, especially if many think it just means qualitative experience.
Definitely "consciousness" is a hopelessly protean term. I'm reflexively suspicious whenever I see it used without qualifiers, or where the usage isn't clear from context.
"This manifest image is considered illusory or largely illusory from the point of view of the scientific mindset ("folk psychology"), which is why science won't attempt to take it seriously,"
I guess it depends on what we mean by "take it seriously". There are some manifest images science can dismiss, like witches, ghosts, or horoscopes. But if the image is unavoidable in day to day life, then I think it has to be accounted for. To me, in those cases. that is taking it seriously.
But science can't just accept intuitive explanations for the manifest, like fundamental consciousness. If that's what not taking it seriously means, then definitely it's guilty. But in those cases I'm not sure it can do anything else and still be science.
Although as I noted the other day, it definitely seems to go back to the sense data theorists. It's interesting to read philosophy from a few decades ago and see how the terminology has changed just since then.
Maths is great, but my feeling is that we frequently mistake our abstractions for reality. Our abstractions are easier to handle, but that's because we created them that way, cutting out all the (hopefully) irrelevant aspects so we can focus on just the key info. I actually try to make a point of being sceptical whenever people start trying to quantify a discussion, because numbers really do lie. We have to be conscious of how our symbols/abstractions are actually related to the concrete realities of real life, otherwise they will mislead us.
"We have to be conscious of how our symbols/abstractions are actually related to the concrete realities of real life, otherwise they will mislead us."
Yes! This is why I thought it would be interesting to discuss Descartes. Regarding his notion of extended substance, it's hard to see how any actual extended thing in the world might be known when we're brought to the conclusion here that sensible qualities cannot be relied on. What, exactly, can be extended, then? How and what can we measure? It seems he has nothing concrete to work with. Substance is really nothing tangible, sensible, or concrete, as many suppose it to be, but is instead an abstraction that Descartes imagines to be the very foundation of material world. I see a similar problem echoed today amongst those who believe "consciousness is an illusion".
On quantifying discussions, I think I get what you mean. I'm imagining those philosophers who like to say "I'm 10 percent sure panpsychism is true." That cracks me up. This sort of thing can be found everywhere in our culture today, of course. Apparently we have a preference for articles loaded with statistics, even dubious ones, and we like to read numerical lists rather than blocks of text.
Yes, it's also unclear why he thinks our perceptions of extension are so much clearer than our perceptions of, say, colour or pitch. I suspect he's being influenced by his invention of Cartesian geometry, whereas a musician might see pitch as more clear and distinct. A philosopher/geometer finds that thinking/geometry are the two foundations of reality. Should we be surprised? Meanwhile a number of artists (eg Rick Rubin) see creativity as fundamental.
It is odd to attach arbitrary numbers to our credences like that. I find it almost like it collapses a mental wave function and determines my credence as much as reveals it. Although it can be oddly useful when used with Bayesian approaches.
The one that really bugs me is when people claim X country is the "happiest". What's the methodology? All too often they incorporate things like economic equality and how democratic the country is in their calculations, but still present it as a measure of happiness.
Re numbered lists, I think
Re numbered lists I think what's going on is that it makes it easier for the brain to grasp each point and to remember them. This has been the case for millenia. Eg in Buddhism there are loads of numbered lists, like the noble eightfold path, the four noble truths, the twelve links of dependent origination, the six realms (number 4 will shock you!) etc. Buddha loved numbered lists, which I guess makes sense for a largely non literate society.
When you think about it, pitch is literally more distinct than "extension of substance in general". After all, if your idea of the world is materialistic, what distinguishes extended substance from anything else? Extension turns out to be extremely broad and not at all distinct.
"I find it almost like it collapses a mental wave function and determines my credence as much as reveals it."
That is hilarious!
Good point about numbered lists and memory. Memorization as a form of education is somewhat lost on us today, though it seems to be more embraced in asian cultures. I remember my mom asking me if I "memorized" my homework. I always bristled at that. But anyway, yeah, having numbered lists helps with recall...or at least you know whether you're forgetting something if you can remember how many items you were supposed to remember.
Well apparently Descartes God is a loophole (self sustaining construct). But I am sure he felt releived!. So let him&Him be.
What troubles me is that in doing so the only knowledge we can have is through other self sustaining constructs like math. , problem is that we actually designed math -trendy word for created/disovered-. Thus greatly tainting and limiting our understanding of the world.
My overall impression is Descartes puts a unique amount of trust in introspection. He doubts everything but what he perceives in his own mind. Does that count as "infallible"? I don't know since he doesn't appear to use these words. It seems like a matter of judgment. But I can see why so many have that take.
Regarding his focus on mathematical knowledge, I do think he overlooks the importance of testing these precise conceptions empirically (that is, with conscious experience). But that's probably why he's usually regarded more as a philosopher than a scientist.
It does seem true that he isn't preoccupied with qualia, but that focus strikes me as something that developed in the 20th century, maybe starting with the sense data theorists. Although I guess an argument could be made that it goes back to C.S. Peirce in 1866. It seems like it could be a reaction to psychology and its exploration of the unconscious mind, and later the development of computing technology. But I might be all wet on this.
Congratulations on the book review!
Usually when Descartes is criticized for believing introspection is infallible, the discussion is specifically about whether the qualities that make up the majority of our ordinary experience are to be trusted (like in that Dennett paper, "Quining Qualia"). Descartes didn't have the word "qualia", of course, but he does talk about qualities such as heat and cold and he singles them out as decidedly not "clear and distinct". He doesn't think heat and cold are intrinsic or infallibly known, but questions whether they are real properties (meaning properties of the external world). It doesn't occur to him to think about whether they might count for something simply by virtue of being experienced; in his view, qualitative experience isn't any sort of reality at all since it gives us no knowledge of the external world.
Now you could say his whole system of doubt is a kind of trust in his own mind. But ordinary experience never recovers from his skepticism. In the end, nothing in normal everyday experience can be trusted.
"Regarding his focus on mathematical knowledge, I do think he overlooks the importance of testing these precise conceptions empirically (that is, with conscious experience). But that's probably why he's usually regarded more as a philosopher than a scientist."
I'm not sure I get what you mean.
One thing to note is that here in this work, Descartes is trying to establish an a priori foundation for science. Today most people in both science and philosophy regard this attempt as both a failure and as unnecessary for science; science doesn't need a secure a priori foundation to establish scientific laws and principles (that's what Descartes is ultimately trying to justify here). But elsewhere, Descartes isn't against experimentation. "Experiment plays no role in Descartes’ deduction of the laws of nature. However, this does not mean that experiment plays no role in Cartesian science." —from SEP.
Honestly I don't know much about Descartes' scientific work. I did find this interesting example in which he uses experimentation to find the causes of a rainbow:
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/descartes-method/#MethMeteDeduCausRain
Our current fascination with "qualia" is peculiar to me. I haven't looked into the matter much, but I suspect you're right that it comes from some notion of 'sensory data—that's why I have a problem with talking about qualities we experience as 'qualia'. We don't actually experience sensory data (except insofar as we experience qualia as a theory about irreducible qualities). It's really funny because this notion that everything can be broken down into irreducible simples is so very much in line with Cartesian thinking (which I didn't talk about here...it's more obvious in Discourse on Method.)
Good point. He does privilege introspection, but not in the way it's usually done in contemporary debates. Ironically, his introspective judgments about what's trustworthy and what isn't are different from contemporary philosophers. Dennett and the others are projecting the more contemporary notions back unto him, always a danger with historical writers.
"I'm not sure I get what you mean."
I just meant that his focus in this work on precise ideas is incomplete in terms of how science is conducted. The actual observation is crucial. Although I did forget that he did experimentation himself.
I don't know much about that scientific work either. I did read that his notion about the pineal gland was based on actual examination of brains. And someone I read revealed that he dissected animals while they were still alive, believing it was okay since he didn't believe they were conscious. (Which seemed to put a lot of faith in his own reasoning.)
"that's why I have a problem with talking about qualities we experience as 'qualia'."
You see a difference between them? I pretty much assumed they were synonymous. But that's the problem with terms like "qualia" or "phenomenal properties". It's never clear what someone means when they use them. And any precise clarification is usually denied as not the correct meaning. It's one reason why I personally try not to use the terms, unless talking about other people's use of them.
"someone I read revealed that he dissected animals while they were still alive, believing it was okay since he didn't believe they were conscious."
So horrible. It's astounding to me that anyone could think animals aren't conscious.
On qualia vs. qualities, yeah, I do think they're different, although I don't think everyone realizes they're different. I think because of the way philosophers talk about qualia, as "what it's like", followed by examples like "to smell a rose", many people think they're just talking about experiencing qualities in an everyday, loose sense, and—to make things even more complicated—sometimes that is all they mean. But other times they use the word in a technical sense, like when they talk about experiences being irreducible or subjective. To me, that characterization is loaded with theoretical commitments, probably derived from the old rationalist-empiricist divide, which relates experiences to 'sense data'. 'Qualia' in this sense doesn't capture ordinary everyday experience, then. When I experience the smell of a rose, I experience the smell of a rose IN a rose, and the rose lives in a world with many other things which others can experience too. I don't experience the smell of a rose as something isolated or private or subjective. If I'm with someone, I'll say, "Smell this. Isn't it lovely?" It's more complicated than this, of course, but essentially what I'm saying is, the public nature of experience is the default. Private qualia is not the default.
Now, I'm not saying science as we understand it today is in a great position to understand qualitative experiences either. So by "public" I don't mean "scientifically accessible", but I realize that's what most people mean these days, which is why I'm pointing this out. I don't equate 'science' with 'public'. By 'public' I just mean our ordinary experience of the world is of a world we share with others. In our ordinary lives, we don't normally experience the world as private or subjective. (I think we'd be miserable, constantly on the verge of committing suicide, if that were the case.)
"But that's the problem with terms like "qualia" or "phenomenal properties". It's never clear what someone means when they use them."
Yeah, I agree. I think it's best to just ask, if possible. I think many people really do just mean qualities or experience in a loose sense.
Your distinction between "qualia" and "qualities" reminds me of David Chalmers' 1995 distinction between "consciousness" and "awareness". He saw "awareness" as referring to functionality, but "consciousness" as referring to the more loaded concept, the one that has the hard problem. I thought it was an interesting definitional proposal, but it sounds like most philosophers didn't take it up.
Both distinctions seem similar to mine between manifest and fundamental consciousness. I think your "qualities" is close to my "manifest qualia" while your "qualia" matches my "fundamental qualia". Although I see the lighter "manifest" version as something science can study.
But I should ask, what prevents qualities, in the sense you're using, from being studied by science? The stronger notion has fundamental ineffability and privacy as obstacles. But if qualities don't have those aspects, then what's the obstacle (or obstacles) for third party observation?
"I think it's best to just ask, if possible."
Unfortunately, not everyone is able or willing to clarify, or understands the distinction. And it's not unusual for the clarification request to be regarded as deliberate obtuseness.
That's interesting about the Chalmers distinction, because I was thinking about those terms myself over the past few days. I think "consciousness" is a very confusing term and I'm beginning to wonder if we're having problems communicating because of it.
What prevents science from understanding experience? See all of the above on Descartes. When he drew a sharp line between the qualitative and quantitative and made it clear only the latter can pertain to objective reality, that was only the beginning. What I'm describing as lived experience is probably what you (and Sellars) are calling the "manifest" image. This manifest image is considered illusory or largely illusory from the point of view of the scientific mindset ("folk psychology"), which is why science won't attempt to take it seriously, even though science grows out of and depends on it. (For instance, Descartes' mathematically extended substance is, when you think about it, dependent on supposedly non-veridical perceptual experiences like that of color, otherwise there's nothing to measure and no way to measure it.) Are these frameworks reconcilable? I don't know. But I don't think redefining the "manifest" in scientific terms will prove satisfactory. And of course I think it says something that the scientific grows out of and depends on the manifest.
"not everyone is able or willing to clarify, or understands the distinction."
I can see that. Not sure there's a great way to deal with the problem in those situations. Of course, we all get emotionally attached to our pet theories, and sometimes unfortunate terminology comes along for the ride. I think we'll be hearing about qualia for a long time yet, especially if many think it just means qualitative experience.
Definitely "consciousness" is a hopelessly protean term. I'm reflexively suspicious whenever I see it used without qualifiers, or where the usage isn't clear from context.
"This manifest image is considered illusory or largely illusory from the point of view of the scientific mindset ("folk psychology"), which is why science won't attempt to take it seriously,"
I guess it depends on what we mean by "take it seriously". There are some manifest images science can dismiss, like witches, ghosts, or horoscopes. But if the image is unavoidable in day to day life, then I think it has to be accounted for. To me, in those cases. that is taking it seriously.
But science can't just accept intuitive explanations for the manifest, like fundamental consciousness. If that's what not taking it seriously means, then definitely it's guilty. But in those cases I'm not sure it can do anything else and still be science.
On the use of "qualia", it's hard to say. It's usage seems to have spiked in recent decades, making me wonder about it's staying power. https://books.google.com/ngrams/graph?content=qualia&year_start=1800&year_end=2022&corpus=en&smoothing=3
Although as I noted the other day, it definitely seems to go back to the sense data theorists. It's interesting to read philosophy from a few decades ago and see how the terminology has changed just since then.
Maths is great, but my feeling is that we frequently mistake our abstractions for reality. Our abstractions are easier to handle, but that's because we created them that way, cutting out all the (hopefully) irrelevant aspects so we can focus on just the key info. I actually try to make a point of being sceptical whenever people start trying to quantify a discussion, because numbers really do lie. We have to be conscious of how our symbols/abstractions are actually related to the concrete realities of real life, otherwise they will mislead us.
"We have to be conscious of how our symbols/abstractions are actually related to the concrete realities of real life, otherwise they will mislead us."
Yes! This is why I thought it would be interesting to discuss Descartes. Regarding his notion of extended substance, it's hard to see how any actual extended thing in the world might be known when we're brought to the conclusion here that sensible qualities cannot be relied on. What, exactly, can be extended, then? How and what can we measure? It seems he has nothing concrete to work with. Substance is really nothing tangible, sensible, or concrete, as many suppose it to be, but is instead an abstraction that Descartes imagines to be the very foundation of material world. I see a similar problem echoed today amongst those who believe "consciousness is an illusion".
On quantifying discussions, I think I get what you mean. I'm imagining those philosophers who like to say "I'm 10 percent sure panpsychism is true." That cracks me up. This sort of thing can be found everywhere in our culture today, of course. Apparently we have a preference for articles loaded with statistics, even dubious ones, and we like to read numerical lists rather than blocks of text.
Yes, it's also unclear why he thinks our perceptions of extension are so much clearer than our perceptions of, say, colour or pitch. I suspect he's being influenced by his invention of Cartesian geometry, whereas a musician might see pitch as more clear and distinct. A philosopher/geometer finds that thinking/geometry are the two foundations of reality. Should we be surprised? Meanwhile a number of artists (eg Rick Rubin) see creativity as fundamental.
It is odd to attach arbitrary numbers to our credences like that. I find it almost like it collapses a mental wave function and determines my credence as much as reveals it. Although it can be oddly useful when used with Bayesian approaches.
The one that really bugs me is when people claim X country is the "happiest". What's the methodology? All too often they incorporate things like economic equality and how democratic the country is in their calculations, but still present it as a measure of happiness.
Re numbered lists, I think
Re numbered lists I think what's going on is that it makes it easier for the brain to grasp each point and to remember them. This has been the case for millenia. Eg in Buddhism there are loads of numbered lists, like the noble eightfold path, the four noble truths, the twelve links of dependent origination, the six realms (number 4 will shock you!) etc. Buddha loved numbered lists, which I guess makes sense for a largely non literate society.
When you think about it, pitch is literally more distinct than "extension of substance in general". After all, if your idea of the world is materialistic, what distinguishes extended substance from anything else? Extension turns out to be extremely broad and not at all distinct.
"I find it almost like it collapses a mental wave function and determines my credence as much as reveals it."
That is hilarious!
Good point about numbered lists and memory. Memorization as a form of education is somewhat lost on us today, though it seems to be more embraced in asian cultures. I remember my mom asking me if I "memorized" my homework. I always bristled at that. But anyway, yeah, having numbered lists helps with recall...or at least you know whether you're forgetting something if you can remember how many items you were supposed to remember.
Well apparently Descartes God is a loophole (self sustaining construct). But I am sure he felt releived!. So let him&Him be.
What troubles me is that in doing so the only knowledge we can have is through other self sustaining constructs like math. , problem is that we actually designed math -trendy word for created/disovered-. Thus greatly tainting and limiting our understanding of the world.
(Just comment i case I got it wrong guys)
Ha! God is a loophole. I like that.
And yes, a mathematical understanding has the benefit of precision, but a great deal is lost in that process.